Tinzenite: Encrypted Peer to Peer File Synchronization via the Tox Protocol by Hartmann, Tamino P.S.M
Ulm University | 89069 Ulm | Germany Faculty of Engineering,
Computer Science,
and Psychology
Institute of Databases
and Information Systems
Tinzenite: Encrypted Peer to Peer
File Synchronization via the Tox Protocol
Master thesis at Ulm University
Author:
Tamino P.S.M. Hartmann
tamino.hartmann@uni-ulm.de
Reviewers:
Professor Doctor Manfred Reichert
Professor Doctor Martin Theobald
Supervisor:
Marc Schickler
Year:
2015
Version October 28, 2015
c© 2015 Tamino P.S.M. Hartmann
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons. Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0
License. To view a copy of this license, visit
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/de/ or send a letter to
Creative Commons, 543 Howard Street, 5th Floor, San Francisco, California, 94105, USA.
Setting: PDF-LATEX 2ε
Abstract
We proposed and implemented an open source, peer to peer, file synchronization
software based on the Tox communication protocol. Targeted features include full secure
communication between peers, an encrypted server peer, and a focus on ease of use
while retaining data security. The software suite was implemented based on the Tox
protocol, with Golang as the programming language, and the server client built to offer
free choice of storage mechanisms, for which we implemented support for the Hadoop
distributed file system. The proof of concept implementation was shown to work and
further possible work discussed.
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1
Introduction
The widespread adoption of the internet in modern culture has caused a large evolution
in the way we use computers. When computers were still new almost all programs
and services were run locally on the machine. Nowadays our usage has shifted to a
multitude of online services and solutions. One of the more well known examples is
digital encyclopedias: Microsoft Encarta was distributed on a single CD upon release.
But today Wikipedia has become synonymous with looking up information – a large
encyclopedia service which can be accessed via the internet. Other examples can be
found a plenty: almost anything is available as a cloud service, from games to web
hosting.
Therefore it should come as no surprise that storing data has also increasingly shown
trends to moving onto the internet. And indeed the multitude of online data storage
services in existence today show the rising trend to store data – not on personal machines
– but to entrust it to third party service providers. Such third party services provide users
with access to their data wherever they can access the internet in general. Dropbox [Dro]
made its name as a popular data storage service provider, but existing internet giants
were quick to follow. Thus both Google and Microsoft also began offering competing
services: Google Drive [Goo] and OneDrive [One] respectively.
All was well for a while. Users merrily entrusted their data to third parties under the
reasoning of ease of access and ease of use. Private data would no longer be lost if the
personal computer stopped functioning for one reason or the other. Additionally the rise
of mobile devices such as smartphones only quickened the adoption of cloud storage
services. The exorbitant pricing of storage space and the lack of removable external
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storage on these mobile devices drove people to solutions that allowed them to access
all their data nonetheless.
In 2013 Edward Snowden revealed that the blind trust in these third party services
was misplaced. Thanks to Snowden’s whistle blowing and personal sacrifice a global
conspiracy of governmental agencies that undertake massive online surveillance of
most internet communications was brought to the public attention. Since the majority
of the global internet players are based in the United States of America, this had huge
implications for all services offered via the internet. Many services used by the majority of
internet users have been shown to be either at risk of being or already are compromised
or even known to explicitly include capabilities for compromising data security. This
includes internet giants such as Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, Paltalk, AOL,
Skype, YouTube, and Apple [GP13]. Snowden also revealed that most data passing
through internet exchange points is surveilled [Hol14]. These form the backbone of the
internet in its current state.
While public outrage lasted just as long as the major news outlets covered it, the
revelations had a major impact in the technical community. New software solutions were
required to enable users to reconquer their privacy on the internet without sacrificing
usability and ease of access. One example is the Open Whisper Systems group. Their
stated goal on the website is "[...] we’re working to advance the state of the art for secure
communication, while simultaneously making it easy for everyone to use." [Whi]. Another
example is the Tox instant messenger community that is building a free, open source,
peer to peer Skype alternative [Toxa].
1.1 Motivation
The thesis is mainly motivated by the revelations of drag net surveillance by Edward
Snowden and the compliance of so called trusted service providers within their legal
obligations and even beyond. The uncovering of the global surveillance network has
shown that we can not entrust third parties with our data without taking additional steps
to secure it. While services such as Boxcryptor [Box] exist to add a layer of encryption
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on top of the data storage services they bring with them a few disadvantages in terms of
ease of use. Notably for this specific example access to the encrypted data is severely
hampered because it can not be accessed via the internet without first decrypting it
additionally.
Services exist that do not rely on a user’s trust to a third party. These peer to peer
solution promise to keep all data of the user only on the user’s machines. However the
lack of a copy of the data on a remote server removes the advantages of web access
over the internet and decrease their utility as data backup services. Examples for existing
peer to peer solutions include BitTorrent Sync [Bitb] and Syncthing [Syn].
Our motivation stems from the hope that we can combine the two types of offering data
storage services into one service that retains most of the advantages. Thus we propose
the implementation of a peer to peer, fully encrypted file synchronization system that
is capable of storing encrypted backups of users’ data on third party servers while still
allowing remote access to it via the internet. We therefore define two types of peers:
trusted peers that store data unencrypted and are intended for the trusted devices of
users and encrypted peers that remove the need to trust third parties while still allowing
them to serve as remote storage providers.
1.2 Goals
This work thus has the goal of designing and implementing a proof of concept that
such a service is possible. The proposed implementation should build on peer to peer
communication, bypassing the requirement of a centrally hosted third party service.
Unlike most existing peer to peer solutions we propose to include support for encrypted
third parties so that the advantages of remote storage are kept. To harden such a
peer to peer network it is necessary to encrypt all communication between the peers.
Instead of integrating and mixing encrypted communications with the file synchronization
commands required for such software to work, we utilize an existing secure peer to
peer communication infrastructure in the form of Tox, on top of which we will propose a
protocol for the sole task of file synchronization. The encryption scheme is to be chosen
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so that while encrypted peers are denied access to a user’s data, authorized access
over the internet is still possible. To facilitate a high flexibility of the encrypted peer we
will also work to implement a storage interface that allows any desired storage system to
be used with a user’s data, from direct disk storage to distributed file systems.
The implementation of the program will be done with Golang, building on Tox for the
communication and the Hadoop distributed file system for storing data on the encrypted
peer. We will expand on the specification and define the scope of this work in preparation.
Apart from the theoretical work a large part of this thesis is also the implementation
of a proof of concept. Therefore we will also discuss problems we encountered while
working on the software aspect and our solutions to them. Finally we will look back at the
implementation and compare it to the theoretical ground work. For a better comparison
a brief discussion on similarities and differences to existing file synchronization services
will also be included.
1.3 Name
Figure 1.1: The preliminary icon of our implementation of Tinzenite.
To differentiate our proof of concept implementation from existing solutions a unique
name was required. We chose the rock-forming mineral tinzenite for the name. We
wanted a name that had some association to a crystal to signify the hardened security
aspect of our work. Furthermore the crystal has a unique orange color that lends itself
well as an icon as can be seen in figure 1.1. Specifically, Tinzenite is the name of the
peer network which in turn is compromised of two distinct software peers which are
based on a common protocol and communication standard.
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Figure 1.2: A graphical representation of the structure of this thesis.
Chapter 2 presents existing software that is relevant to our work, as well as related
papers. Built on this we will define the concept of this thesis in chapter 3. Chapter 4
describes the theoretical architecture that Tinzenite will be based on. The implementation
of the architecture into our proof of concept implementation will be discussed in chapter 5.
We will expand on the completed work in chapter 6 and note what possible future work
could be built on top of the provided thesis. Finally chapter 7 will conclude this thesis
and provide a general closing statement. Figure 1.2 shows a graphical representation of
the structure of this thesis.
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2
Related and Existing Work
This chapter serves two purposes. First we will discuss existing solutions. The differ-
ences between these and our proposed work will serve to highlight in what ways our
work expands existing solutions. Then we will take a look at the academic side of file
synchronization and discuss related papers. These will serve as a foundation for how
we implement the Tinzenite protocol.
2.1 Existing Software
Figure 2.1: Example diagrams of a server client architecture (left) and a peer to peer architecture
(right). Note that the peer to peer architecture does not exclude servers as peers.
For any internet technology there are two options for how to structure its architecture in
general. Most of the internet today is cleanly divided in a client-server structure where a
client always requests information from a central server. This is a strongly hierarchical
structure. An example of this is downloading a PDF from a website. The other option
is a distributed peer to peer model, where a client requests information from any other
client and in turn will also respond to queries from other clients. One of the more well
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known candidates of this is the Bittorrent protocol [Bita]. Both options have been used in
existing file synchronization solutions. See figure 2.1 for an example diagram of the two
architectures. we have divided the existing software between these two extremes and
will shortly discuss these in the following sections.
2.1.1 Client-Server Solutions
For client-server solutions any user must rely on the availability of the central server.
These are often hosted by third parties in a distributed manner for reasons of performance
and scaling. Providing a central service that is required for the file synchronization to
work also allows easy monetization. Since a large amount of such services exist, we
will highlight only the three most popular ones for this thesis. These are respectively:
Dropbox with 300 million users, Microsoft’s OneDrive with 250 million users, and Google
Drive with 240 million users as of 2014 [Gri14].
Dropbox
Dropbox [Dro] is one of the most popular cloud storage providers currently and is known
by many users looking for a solution that works across multiple operating systems.
Positive features include web access to stored data, clients for many different platforms,
easy sharing of data with outsiders, and ease of use. On the negative side the service
relies on its back-end servers, although computers can synchronize files between
themselves on a local area network. Dropbox also lacks any end to end encryption,
but does encrypt data while in transit and when "at rest" in their data centers [Bor14].
Therefore it comes with little surprise that they were prominently featured in the Snowden
leaks [RT 14]. The company does have full access to any data the user uploads to their
servers, as long as the users do not encrypt the files beforehand themselves. Therefore
we can extrapolate that Dropbox can offer up a user’s data if required to by a fourth party,
as is the case in the United States of America via PRISM by the NSA [GP13].
Dropbox offers a free account for a basic storage plan. Additional storage capacity is
available for purchase or by referrals that lead to account creations. None of the core
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applications have been open sourced to date, meaning even if Dropbox implemented
strong encryption it could not be independently verified. This includes client software
and server software.
OneDrive
With the release of Microsoft’s newest operating system the company has increased its
push for public adoption of its OneDrive [One] cloud storage service. It is now directly
integrated within Windows 10 and is opt-out for users that do not wish to utilize it.
OneDrive is integrated with Microsoft’s answer to Google Docs, Office 365. Furthermore
more free storage is added for registering devices and using Microsoft’s products.
Similar to its two competitors, the base plan is free, with the option of paying monthly for
an increase in storage space. No software for OneDrive has been open sourced.
Google Drive
Google Drive [Goo] is similar to Dropbox in term of its functionality. It does go a step
further than Dropbox by integrating tightly with their suite of online applications for
creating and editing documents, named Google Docs. Google also has full access to
all data that users upload to their servers. This in turn means that under the PRISM
program by the NSA, all such data is also retrievable by a fourth party [RT 13].
Google also offers a basic storage amount at no charge for the user. Again additional
space can be purchased on a monthly basis. Apart from offering access to fewer clients
than Dropbox, Google also has failed to open source the components of its service.
2.1.2 Peer to Peer Solutions
Peer to peer systems work without a central server. The trade off is that such solutions
require assistance in locating other peers, which means that some form of a peer
discovery system must be implemented. While this could be done via a central server,
9
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nowadays the common solution to the problem is a distributed hash table [RFH+01] which
is used to look up the required peers. Once another peer has been found the connection
can be established. Apart from not relying on the availability and trustworthiness of a
central server, peer to peer solutions offer a possible performance advantage as they
can distribute bandwidth between every peer, even actively unchoke a saturated peer.
As an added bonus the path data takes between two peers will always be the most direct
path as no data must first go towards a third party. This bonus can be lost if onion routing
is implemented for anonymity purposes.
BitTorrent Sync
An existing solution for a peer to peer data synchronization service is Sync [Bitb] from
the BitTorrent company. It is built on existing BitTorrent technology and thus keeps many
of the positive features associated with BitTorrents: reducing the impact of transferring
large files over a limited network. Therefore it has no central point of failure and can
even run without internet access by transferring files between computers on a local
area network directly. However, just as the client-server solutions before, Sync is closed
source.
Clients exist for a multitude of platforms. While information is encrypted in transfer, there
is no differentiation for untrusted clients. Sync is free for basic usage, but requires a
paid account for additional features that offer more fine grained control. This includes
advanced data sharing options. Unlike Syncthing BitTorrent Sync is capable of sharing
content to third parties that are not part of the data storage service.
Syncthing
Syncthing [Syn] is an open source file synchronization software on an equally free block
exchange protocol. This protocol is a mixed data transfer and communication protocol
in one, with encryption for all communication built in directly. Again the user can not
designate untrusted peers or specify peers to retain only an encrypted copy of the data.
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Unlike the other solutions mentioned here, Syncthing is open source and can thus be
independently verified to be secure. Like Tinzenite it is also implemented in Golang.
The downside is that Syncthing lacks a feature which BitTorrent Sync shares with most
client-server solutions: the capability of sharing a specified file or directory with other
users who are not part of the storage system.
2.1.3 Additional Security Layers
It is of course possible to encrypt all data beforehand before using any data storage
service such as those mentioned. This has a few notable downsides however. For many
client-server solutions the user loses out on web access to the data along with a host
of additional feature built on the availability of the data. While advanced users may
be capable of encrypting their data themselves using a range of available tools, such
solutions require the user to manage the encryption keys themselves. This is a non
trivial issue beyond adding an additional hurdle to using data storage services. As so
often commercial solutions for this exist as the following example shows.
Boxcryptor
All three server-client services mentioned are not to be trusted with private information
that must remain secure due to possible fourth party access. However solutions for
encrypting the data sent over such services which manage the encryption keys exist.
One example of such a service is the Boxcryptor software [Box]. It encrypts all data
before uploading it to the connected cloud storage service and decrypts it when retrieving
it. The user keys are attached to the user’s account. Asymmetric encryption is used
to upload all keys to the companies key server so that other clients can retrieve and,
with a correct password, decrypt the data. Sharing of data is still possible even for users
without an account by utilizing special keys.
The downside to this approach is mainly that it has to be used on top of an existing cloud
storage service. This effectively means that the user must run an additional program on
top of the file storage service to ensure secure data. Boxcryptor can be used with most
11
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existing third party data storage systems. Boxcryptor offers a free version of its service,
but to access all security features a paid subscription is required. The software is not
open source and thus not independently verifiable.
2.1.4 Comparison
In this section we will briefly highlight the capabilities and differences between the
discussed existing solutions. We chose to compare the features that we believe to be
most important to this thesis. See table 2.1.
Name Architecture Free
Storage
Client-side
Encryption
Open
Source
Account
Required
Dropbox Centralized 2 GB X
OneDrive Centralized 15 GB X
Google
Drive
Centralized 15 GB X
Boxcryptor –a –b X X
BitTorrent
Sync
Distributed ∞ X
Syncthing Distributed ∞ X
a Boxcryptor is used on top of an existing cloud storage provider. The encryption infrastructure itself is centralized.
b Boxcryptor is free to use but many features are only available for a paid account.
Table 2.1: This table serves to highlight the differences between the existing software previously
discussed.
2.2 Related Research
The following discussion concerns papers that we believe have an impact on our work.
We discuss their general content with a focus on what information we extracted and how
we believe we can apply it to Tinzenite.
2.2.1 What is a File Synchronizer?
The paper by Balasubramaniam and Pierce [BP98] has the stated goal of offering a
framework for describing the behavior of file synchronizers. Notably the paper’s authors
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divide the process into two separate phases: update detection and reconciliation. Update
detection is defined as the recognition of where updates have been made to the directory
since the last synchronization. Reconciliation is defined as the combination of updates
between peers to transfer all peers to a new, synchronized state.
For Tinzenite we assimilated a few things out of this paper: primarily the distinction
between the update detection and the reconciliation phase. We will also initially ignore
links and file permissions due to increased complexity, but unlike them we will never
modify a file ourself. The paper also gave us a definition for the type of update detection
strategy we wanted to try: namely the modtime inode strategy. Ideally we would take
an on-line update detector but this seems impossible to do under Linux currently for an
unlimited amount of files. Also of interest is the differentiation between pull and push
models for propagating updates. Tinzenite intends to be a hybrid between the two: while
the main work will be done via push – once peers have established a connection –
updates may also be propagated via pull for performance reasons. In the reconciliation
section of the paper is the listing of the various possible states that two replicas of
a directory can possibly reach given a set of operations, which is also of interest for
this thesis. We intend to ensure that the core protocol for Tinzenite will be capable of
handling all of them to the best of its abilities.
2.2.2 An Algebraic Approach to File Synchronization
The paper by Ramsey and Csirmaz [RC+01] presents an algebra for reasoning about
file system operations with the intended purpose of specifying an algorithm for file
synchronization. Interesting for our work is the discussion of possible commands that
can be executed on said file algebra. While from a user’s point of view a multitude of
operations seems possible (create, remove, rename, move, derive, and edit) the paper’s
authors distill these down to just three for the technical side: create, remove, and edit.
Rename can be executed by removing the original file and creating a new file with
the new name while keeping the content identical. Move can be executed much the
same but keeps the name, instead changing the location where the new file is created.
Derive is argued to be indistinguishable from edit without higher level knowledge. While
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not impossible to detect, this feature we consider to be beyond the scope of Tinzenite.
Features that Tinzenite shares with the paper’s prototype include that parents must be
created before their children and that children must be removed before their parents.
The paper also offers a number of improvements that Tinzenite will or could incorporate.
Notably this includes support for an explicit move command. This would remove the
need for removing and recreating a file’s content when it was moved, thus making this
operation more performant.They also suggest using fingerprints of content to avoid
sending data that already exists. Tinzenite already utilizes content hashes, so expanding
it to be more intelligent about when to request actual data to be sent should be easily
implementable by comparing hashes of files before requesting transfers.
2.2.3 Peer-to-Peer Reconciliation Based Replication for Mobile
Computers
In [RPG+96], Reiher et al. nicely state the benefits and drawbacks of using a peer to
peer system for file synchronization in regard to mobile devices. Benefits include not
having to rely on an permanently available server, being able to transfer files without
access to a central server, and transferring files over the shortest available network path.
The authors list as drawbacks the higher required complexity of the algorithms used
to control the replication. They conclude that peer to peer replication is well suited for
mobile devices.
2.2.4 Perspectives on Optimistically Replicated, Peer-to-Peer Filing
The paper by Page et al. [PJGH+98] is notable in our case for two main reasons. It offers
a nice set of definitions of problems that we must also solve for Tinzenite and even offers
relevant solutions. The authors also discuss the performance of their implementation.
Focus of the paper is the evaluation of the use of optimistic replica consistency, automatic
update conflict detection and repair, the peer to peer interaction model, and the Ficus
design and construction.
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Relevant for Tinzenite is the paper’s solution to the insert delete ambiguity. The solution
is to keep a list of deletions until all peers know of the deletion. Only then can the deletion
actually be garbage collected. In Tinzenite we will use a similar approach.
2.3 Conclusion
Based on the listed existing solutions and the briefly discussed related papers we have
synthesized a set of features that we wish Tinzenite to have. These will be discussed
in the next chapter. More importantly our research highlights a few problems that we
will need to solve or use already existing solutions for. This starts with defining the
operations we will allow on objects within a directory and continue on to how to solve
ambiguities and merge conflicts when synchronizing between multiple peers.
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Concept
The following chapter discusses all conceptual work that went into creating Tinzenite.
We will first give an overview of the basic goals of the work created by this thesis. Next
we will expand on the goals by discussing the features we would like Tinzenite to have
and defining their scope. These will be based in part on the existing solutions discussed
in the related work chapter. Based on the concept and the proposed features we will
explain the software components we plan to implement.
3.1 Basic Goals
The stated goal of Tinzenite is to offer a peer to peer solution for file synchronization
that builds on the strengths of Tox (see section 3.3.2). It is important to us to build the
system in a way that it is secure from unauthorized access by third parties, even if they
retain a copy of the data. In fact we propose an explicit client for third party support so
that third parties can offer a storage peer as a service.
Therefore we will need to develop a protocol for a decentralized and distributed system
that relies on the underlying secure channel. Based on this we hope to implement a
proof of concept peer client for normal computers and a third party client that securely
stores the user’s data off site. This encrypted peer should allow the storage of data using
the Hadoop file system (see section 3.3.3).
As proof of the protocol we will implement both programs in Golang (see section 5.1.1).
The programs should cover the basic requirements for file synchronization and work
correctly for all base cases. Thus we will have an actual implementation with which we
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can compare our proposal against existing solutions and highlight derived problems,
solutions, and differences.
3.2 Features
This section will define the features we would like Tinzenite to have, including features
that go beyond the scope of this thesis. Therefore we will classify the features by scope.
The exact features we would like to have have been synthesized from the existing and
related work from the previous chapter.
1. File Synchronization Protocol Design of an extensible protocol on which all
communication between peers will be based. The open specification will allow the
development of compatible peers by others, important for the extensibility of the
system.
2. Peer to Peer Architecture The complete software suite should run in a direct peer
to peer mode to remove the requirement of third parties to facilitate data exchange
and to remove the associated security risk. We also hope that this feature will allow
clients to synchronize independently of the internet: peers should be capable of
utilizing local connections directly.
3. Secure Transport All communication between all clients should always be fully
end to end encrypted.
4. Third Party Client A dedicated client for untrusted third party servers that holds
only an encrypted copy of the data.
5. Shadow Files It should be possible to avoid having to fetch unwanted files for
space constrained clients. Dubbed shadow objects, this feature could be important
for mobile devices as they run on power and bandwidth constraints.
6. Delta Updates Since it is wasteful to transfer redundant data when only small
parts of files are changed, we would like to add the capability to only send the delta
difference between two files.
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7. Object Atomicity We will not touch the content of files, instead we will treat them
as singular objects. This should help to guarantee that files are never modified by
the system beyond the required operations for synchronization. In particular this
forbids automatically merging changes in files. All conflicts must be resolved by
the user: we do not intend to guess the correct resolution strategy for any file type.
8. Passive Peer Since the third party client already stores all data fully encrypted,
support for a passive encrypted peer could be easily added. This would allow the
user to use storage devices as additional peers which can be activated by pointing
Tinzenite at them whenever they are connected. Much like using mobile active
peers as data bridges this feature would allow passive peers to also serve as data
bridges while keeping the data fully secure.
9. Performance The proposed protocol should allow for the client software to run
as unobtrusively as possible. This includes requiring only the bare necessity of
performance for all operations and avoiding redundant work.
Please note that many further features are not dependent on the capability of the
Tinzenite system but on the implementation of peers. An example for this is web access
to an encrypted storage: this is a feature that explicitly can be implemented in a secure
way1.
3.2.1 Scope of Work
In this brief section we will go through the exact scope that this work is to fulfill. We
therefore divide the above features into three categories, ranging from those required to
have for the thesis to be considered successful, to those that can be added as extras
if time permits or as future work – see section 6.2. Furthermore we will expand on the
actual implementation work we intend for each scope definition.
1The key for decrypting the data can be unlocked by users in the web browser by entering the correct pass
phrase. Utilizing the shadow file capability the web application would act as a temporary trusted peer
until the users are done with their data access.
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MUST Have These features are required for the thesis to be considered basically
successful. This means that the basic fundamentals of the proposed complete scope
have been met and are in working order. Specifically this includes a fully working
computer client based on a specified API on which all future work can be built on. This
client must offer the basics required to get the system to work in a user friendly manner
from setup through daily usage. Data transfer between multiple trusted clients must work
as expected with collision detection and correct version iteration upon updates. Notably
this will require of us to implement the entire communication stack and the directory
management parts of Tinzenite.
File Synchronization Protocol The core protocol must be fully capable of basic file
synchronization.
Peer to Peer Architecture The base client and library must be capable of run-
ning without a centralized system.
Secure Transport All communication must be fully encrypted.
Object Atomicity Files must not be modified by the system beyond
the modifications required for the synchronization.
SHOULD Have Features in this category are features that built on the MUST have
features and are thus not strictly required. In broad terms this includes two important
aspects. First and foremost is the capability of having a peer that only retains an
encrypted version of the data. Built on this the second aspect is the server client that
only retains an encrypted data set of a user’s Tinzenite directory. The server also adds
the capability of handling multiple users’ data on a distributed file system capable of
handling the large data size that is to be expected for multiple concurrent users.
Third Party Client The capability of supporting encrypted clients should be imple-
mented.
Protocol Extension To enable an encrypted third party client, the core protocol will
have to be expanded.
Performance Working on an additional peer type should allow us to improve
performance of the protocol.
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COULD Have These features are features that will only be implemented if all previous
features have been successfully integrated. They are not required for the thesis to
be considered successful but would be nice to have to fully complete the proposed
functionality. Primary aspects that would be added in this phase are additional clients with
differing functionality: a mobile client for Android, a web interface for accessing encrypted
server clients, and a passive storage client. These would require additional protocol
extensions to support higher performance and better control over the synchronization,
such as shadow files and delta updates.
Shadow Files Peers could be allowed to only fetch files that the user explicitly wishes
to have synchronized on a peer basis.
Delta Updates Transfer times of files over limited bandwidths could be optimized by
only transferring the differences between them.
Web Interface Support for accessing an encrypted peer via a website.
Mobile Client Implement a client that can run on an Android device.
Passive Peer Built on top of the functionality required for the third party client we
could also implement the capability that Tinzenite can use passive
storage as passive encrypted peers.
3.3 Dependencies
This section will introduce the software and programming language this thesis will be
based on. We will include a brief overview of each technology and highlight some points
that are important to our work. A more technical discussion on these technologies can
be found in section 5.1.
3.3.1 Golang
Our implementation language of choice is Golang, usually referred to by the shorthand
Go [Golc]. Since the main language at Ulm University is mostly Java for student work,
this thesis will hopefully also offer some insight into the differences between the two.
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Golang was first created at Google in 2007, but announced and open sourced in
2009. The reason for yet another language is given in the language’s frequently asked
questions page as: "Go is an attempt to combine the ease of programming of an
interpreted, dynamically typed language with the efficiency and safety of a statically
typed, compiled language. It also aims to be modern, with support for networked and
multicore computing. Finally, it is intended to be fast: it should take at most a few seconds
to build a large executable on a single computer." [Gola]. Since Tinzenite is a networked
system and offers many possible applications for using concurrent operations it was
deemed a good match for this thesis. More information on the origin of the language
and its design goals can be found in this article [Pik12].
3.3.2 Tox
A core aspect of this thesis is implementing the system using the peer to peer encrypted
communication channel provided by the Tox communication suite [Toxa]. Initially devel-
oped as a Skype replacement the underlying transport layer was also intended to be
usable for alternative services. We will make use of this and let Tox handle most of the
communication aspects.
Unlike many other communication applications, Tox does not require a user to register an
account somewhere. Instead a user can create as many Tox identities as desired locally.
Each identity consists of a public and private key where the public key is the identity
of the user [Toxb]. Tox identities are dynamically mapped to the user’s current internet
address whenever the users are online via a distributed hash table. Once two users are
online at the same time2 and have added each other as friends they can establish a
communication channel. The Tox messaging clients use the channel to facilitate text,
audio, and video chats, with support for file transfers. All data is encrypted with perfect
forward secrecy and sent directly from one client to the other3.
Tinzenite will build on the peer to peer, distributed, and encrypted communication channel
provided. In our case each directory on each peer will be its own Tox identity. Every
2Tox is currently not capable of offline messaging. However the feature is planned to be implemented
some time in the future.
3Although TCP relay tunneling is sometimes used to punch through obstructions.
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directory that is synchronized between multiple devices has its own network of friends
which consists of the group of authorized peers. For the setup Tinzenite will require
the user to allow the initial connection to any single other peer. The friend list is then
synchronized by Tinzenite between all peers automatically.
3.3.3 Hadoop File System
As the encrypted server peer is intended to run as a service for multiple parallel different
Tinzenite peers of multiple users it will require some extra work into how to store the large
amount of data. Since storing large amounts of data requires significant management
work we will provide an implementation of the encrypted peer that can write its encrypted
data to the Hadoop Distributed File System [Bor07]. This file system is part of Apache
Hadoop software library for scalable distributed software [Had].
Utilizing the Hadoop file system brings us a few sought after advantages. It will allow
the encrypted peer to be implemented without having to give much thought to the actual
storage and retrieval of data. We can thus build on the Hadoop file system’s high fault
tolerance which in turn allows the encrypted peer to run on inexpensive hardware with
low risk of data loss.
3.4 Software Scope
Figure 3.1: Example Tinzenite network with all proposed possible clients. Note that not all clients
communicate via the underlying Tox communication network.
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This section is dedicated to differentiating the possible client applications we will imple-
ment as reference implementations. Figure 3.1 shows an overview of how the various
parts could mesh together to form a complete Tinzenite network. Note that the exact
feature set is to be determined by the required development time of each feature and
thus might lead to some features or even complete clients not being implemented for the
thesis. Those features can be implemented at a later time if so desired and will thus be
referenced in the future work (see section 6.2).
3.4.1 Tinzenite Core Library
The Tinzenite core library is the central reference implementation of the protocol. It builds
directly on the Tox core library and wraps the complete communication of Tinzenite.
Programs that implement the provided functionality will attach callbacks and call public
methods to interface with it. The library will also handle watching a specified directory
on disk. If the user modifies the contents of the directory that is watched by the library it
will update its internal model and start trying to synchronize the changes to other peers.
To keep development of clients as easy as possible while at the same time keeping the
protocol consistent between them we will separate the core logic for Tinzenite from any
user oriented code. This will ensure a maximum of adaptability for clients, meaning
that they will not be constrained by the cross platform capabilities of the library itself.
The only limiting factor for porting the library to other platforms is the availability of the
required Tox core library beneath it.
3.4.2 Client Peer
The basic client peer will be developed first and serve to validate the protocol. This
software will be the target of the user’s primary interaction with the Tinzenite system.
Therefore we plan on including full coverage for required assistance in connecting
peers and setting them up. The client peer will always be a trusted peer and thus
store the user’s data in clear text on the disk. Since the client peer will be the primary
implemented peer, it will evolve directly with the core library. Advanced features that may
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be implemented include but are not limited to support for shadow files and a low system
footprint so that the client software can be run continuously without negatively impacting
the operating system performance. From the user’s point of view the client software will
provide an interface to connect to and accept new and existing peers.
3.4.3 Server Peer
The second dedicated software to be developed is the server peer. This software will
implement an encrypted peer for the Tinzenite network. As the task of encrypting data
falls to the trusted peer before uploading said data, the server peer must only offer a
simple key value storage system for writing the encrypted data somewhere where it can
later be retrieved. Thus the encrypted peer allows clients to offer a storage interface and
will use that instead of writing via a self specified method.
As a proof of concept that this is going to work we will develop two instances of such a
storage interface. The first one will be a simple store and retrieval to the local disk where
the encrypted peer is running. The other one will utilize the Hadoop file system to offer
an example of a large scale distributed storage system as it might be used on an actual
server for multiple users.
Unlike the client peer however we do not require user interfaces and file watchers. Since
the encrypted peer must only be started and connected to an existing network, no further
user interaction than those two operations are required. A file watcher like the client peer
is not required because updates can not originate from the encrypted data set. These
encrypted peers will also utilize a different subset of the communication protocol as they
operate essentially as blind data dumps.
3.4.4 Web Interface Peer
Built on top of an encrypted server peer it should theoretically be possible to implement
access to the encrypted data for the user via a web interface. This can be realized by
allowing users to enter their password which in turn unlocks the decryption keys required
to decrypt the stored data. By utilizing client side code within a web browser, these
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operations can be done without involving the server peer beyond its use as a blind data
store. This peer would require a Javascript implementation of the Tinzenite protocol.
Golang can be compiled to Javascript [Gitc] which should allow at least some reuse of
existing code.
3.4.5 Mobile Peer
Nowadays no software is complete without a complimenting mobile application. Thus
Tinzenite should also offer a mobile client for the Android platform [And]. Apart from
the specific touchscreen oriented interface this peer would prove that Tinzenite can
run on mobile platforms. This would build on Golang’s cross platform support even
for Android [Golb]. Further work may be done here to ensure that Tinzenite runs in a
mobile friendly way. This implies low power consumption and low bandwidth capabilities.
Therefore support for shadow files and deltas is almost strictly required to meet the
needs of a mobile peer. When first using the mobile peer for the first time it may even be
beneficial to ask the user whether the mobile peer should pull all data or just immediately
mark everything as shadow objects, thus requiring the user to mark files manually to be
fetched locally but reducing bandwidth requirements enormously.
3.4.6 Passive Peer
While not in itself a program, support for blind data dumps as passive peers is another
aspect for which Tinzenite could be expanded to include support for. This feature would
require of Tinzenite to run the base encrypted peer logic on a given directory without
the communication aspect via Tox. These passive peers would allow easy backups of
directories on passive storage media that can be easily updated by connecting it to an
active peer.
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The following section will define the data model each peer keeps of its data and specify
the API for updating it between peers, both trusted and encrypted. Therefore we start
this chapter with an explanation of all meta information that a trusted peer stores, as
everything else is based on top of this information. Then we will define and explain
the model each peer keeps of the stored data. Built on this model we will discuss the
messages used to facilitate the update of the model between clients. Then we will
discuss the protocol extensions required for the encrypted model. Finally we will take a
look at the advanced features and how they can be built on top of the previous work.
We chose to use JSON for all communication between peers as further discussed in
section 5.1.2. Therefore generally speaking all messages will be defined as JSON
messages. Additionally most data is written to storage as JSON files. This has the
advantage of allowing easy manual access to all files and message for development
purposes since JSON messages can be sent as simple text messages via the normal
Tox chat clients.
4.1 Meta Data
Since a trusted peer must store the last known state of the directory to detect changes
for later synchronizations, we must store this information to storage somewhere. For
Tinzenite we took a page from Git and decided to write this information within the
directory to be synchronized. To reduce visual clutter and to hide it from users this
directory is offered by a hidden directory directly below the root directory. We specified
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it as ".tinzenite". In short it contains organizational files, temporary objects, and the
deletion directory for storing files until they have been fully removed by all peers, plus
data private to the peer. Figure 4.1 gives a broad overview of the contents.
( .tinzenite/
( org/
( peers/
( auth.json
( removed/
( temp/
( receiving/
( sending/
( local/
( rmstore/
( model.json
( self.json
( .tinignore
Figure 4.1: Overview of the special meta information directory that Tinzenite uses to store
relevant information required for the managing of the directory. For brevity sub
directories that contain instance data are not expanded.
Placing the meta data within the directory has a few benefits for the complexity of the
system and enables it to utilize the full feature set of the implemented synchronization
capabilities to share data between peers when required. Specifically only the "org"
directory and the "removed" directory are synchronized just as any user data, along with
the ".tinignore" file which specifies to ignore all other objects in the meta directory. The
choice to use Tinzenite itself to handle these directories and files was done as they are
required for trusted peers to work correctly. The "org" directory is included because it
contains both the authentication file and the peer files – both are required to be kept
synchronized between all other trusted peers. The "removed" directory is included due
to how removals must be handled as discussed in section 4.2.3.
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4.1.1 Organizational Directory
The "org" directory consists of two objects: the file containing the authentication in-
formation and a sub folder which contains a file for each known peer. It is first of two
directories that are synchronized along with user specified files between peers, as both
the authentication file and the peer list are required for all peers to function correctly.
Authentication File
The authentication file stores information required for the complete Tinzenite network.
This includes information on the user, information on the directory the network synchro-
nizes, and the encryption keys required to encrypt and decrypt data for encrypted peers.
Since the authentication file is not encrypted upon upload to encrypted peers as it is
meant to be used to enable user account management, all personal or otherwise critical
information is stored either hashed or fully encrypted. Listing 4.1 shows the contents of
an example authentication file.
0 {
1 "User": "$2a$10$E8Wlr9Jn/EYJLZ7J0yZoR.Qscp.MKD2kG8dHF7OQWYNA1mCfp.Qqe",
2 "Dirname": "sync",
3 "DirID": "ffff1d4cbfded232",
4 "Secure": "Kbk4+sx17VKHma1Z67OU6R7TbHPWMr4SpZhWUQqheS/CNcKKHVYjTTSv0rbF4qDAa0
vwikigsm7wHhy4iGjWB84i0ErO7rNwhqrPPxudeDM=",
5 "Nonce": [255,142,165,173,201,188,98,116,29,31,173,181,84,84,137,54,159,50,193,248,
51,162,76,195]
6 }
Listing 4.1: An example of an authentication file.
The key "User" stores a bcrypt hash [PM99] of the user’s name. This is important for
example for the support of encrypted third party peers: they can attach accounts to
the provided user name for controlling server side access. It provides a way to enable
encrypted server service providers to attach their own accounts directly into a Tinzenite
network so that access can be managed. The user given name of the directory is stored
in "Dirname". It is not hashed so that the user can easily read which directory the current
authentication file belongs to. We also need a way to distinguish multiple synchronized
directories from each other: this is the random unique hash stored in "DirID". This
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unique identification also allows us to differentiate multiple Tinzenite networks that might
share a directory name. Again, this can be used by third party service providers to
differentiate the amount of directories that a user can store with them. The encryption
keys for encrypting and decrypting file data for encrypted peers is stored in "Secure".
These keys are encrypted with a password derived encryption scheme further discussed
in section 5.4.2. "Nonce" stores the nonce value that is required additionally to the user
provided password to successfully access the encryption keys.
Peer Files
Within the "peers" folder Tinzenite writes all data related to synchronization peers. It is
in essence the contact list, filled with information required to access peers. This includes
a peer’s address, trust, and further user defined information.
0 {
1 "Name": "box",
2 "Address": "b6ad2388839d3068f9d6562c10d1151dd87818373c88cf9aad829144c63aac36",
3 "Protocol": 1,
4 "Trusted": false,
5 "Identification": "19baf5873da66797"
6 }
Listing 4.2: An example of a peer JSON object. Note that the encryption attribute is not to be
trusted, it is only an optimization.
Listing 4.2 shows the structure of an example peer file. One of these must exist for
all known peers. The "Name" is the user defined name for each peer, to be used by
the user to make differentiating between peers easier. Internally however the peer is
referenced by the random assigned hash stored in "Identification". The Tox address is
stored in "Address". Whenever a new peer is added and its peer file distributed to all
known peers, they can use this information to automatically accept connections to the
new peer. The "Trusted" attribute is an optimization: peers for which this value is false
don’t need to receive and decline a challenge. It is important to note that the other way
around is not true: if the value is false the other peer must still respond successfully
to a challenge. Finally the "Protocol" value defines via which protocol the peer can be
reached. This is currently unused as we only use Tox.
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4.1.2 Removed Directory
( removed/
( db198086d1708794/
( check/
( 927325d7a930dac9
( ec021135799691ae
( done/
( 927325d7a930dac9
Figure 4.2: Example of the removed directory with an active removal pending. Note the missing
file in "done" which would signify the completion of the removal.
The "removed" directory stores objects that are pending removal as described in sec-
tion 4.2.3. An example of the directory with a pending removal can be seen in figure 4.2.
Notably this directory is synchronized among Tinzenite peers just as any data the user
synchronizes. This is due to the fact that removals must be synchronized by all peers.
For each object that is removed a directory with the object’s identification is created.
Within this directory two sub directories are created in which empty files named after
peer identifications are placed. In the "check" directory peers write a file named after
each peer who must confirm the removal. The "done" directory contains a file named
after every peer that has applied the removal and is now also waiting for it to complete.
4.1.3 Unsynchronized Directories
All other directories within the ".tinzenite" directory are not synchronized between peers
as they are only used to store locally relevant data. The file which contains the rules for
this is the ".tinignore" file (for more information on ignore rules see section 5.3.1).
The "temp", "received", and "sending" directories are used for files in transit either in
preparation before being sent encrypted or upon receiving before being applied to the
local directory. Files are transmitted by chunks by Tox. Therefore, to keep the RAM
storage requirements down, these blocks are immediately written to storage. This also
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avoids partially overwritting user accessible files if the transfer fails for some reason,
thus ensuring that Tinzenite only overwrites the user’s files when it is ready to do so with
a complete file.
The "local" directory is used for three purposes. First a copy of the peer’s own peer
information is written into a file alongside with a binary dump that the underlying Tox
channel requires to run which contains the persistent state information. Second the
actual model is written to storage here, although not as a fully expanded object tree
as specified in section 4.2. Instead Tinzenite writes the internal representation of the
model to storage as JSON. This differentiates in a few key points, but primarily serves to
store both the absolute path and to keep the directory tree in a flat representation that is
more efficient to actually work with. Finally the "rmstore" directory keeps a record of all
previously completed removals in the case that a peer tries to reintroduce a completed
removal.
4.2 Object Model
This section will describe our solution to how Tinzenite keeps track of objects within a
directory. This data will be henceforth referenced to as the data model or just model.
Based on this we will highlight how Tinzenite applies object operations on the model in a
further section.
The model is required to enable detection of newly created and removed files, since
Tinzenite does not actively watch a directory. Having a stored representation of a
directory significantly eases the difficulty of detecting file creations and removals, even if
the peer software is not running. Any entry in the model is generally referred to as an
object if the distinction between a directory or file is not required.
An important feature that the model should have is that it should represent an arbitrarily
complex object structure in the most simple way possible. Therefore there are only two
assumptions we will make for the structure of any directory: namely that it contains files
sorted in nested directories. Out of this tree view we can immediately synthesize our
two main components that we will require: a file model (a leaf) and a directory model (a
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node). Since a peer is intended to have a directory as the root node from which to run,
the core element will always be a directory. An example of the proposed model structure
can be seen in 4.3.
( Root Directory/
( .tinzenite/
( Sub Directory/
( File
( File
( File
( File
Figure 4.3: An example of how a data model of a directory is structured. The .tinzenite directory
is discussed in section 4.1.
Since each file is considered a binary blob and must not be modified by Tinzenite in any
way to preserve data integrity, any additional information that Tinzenite is required to
store for an object must be kept within the model itself. Out of this we can see which
values need to be stored within the model for each object specifically.
Each object in the model will be specified for identification purposes by a unique randomly
generated hash. This hash allows us to decouple the name of the object from its model
representation, effectively serving as the same function as node identification numbers
when stored on a hard drive. Furthermore each model object will contain a path variable
that specifies the relative path of the object in the directory tree. This has the purpose
of allowing the placement of all files in the correct locations on storage for a given root
path.
0 "Version": {
1 "927325d7a930dac9": 1,
2 "19baf5873da66797": 4,
3 "ec021135799691ae": 3
4 }
Listing 4.3: An example of a version vector clock. Each hash is the identification of a trusted
peer, the associated number which version of an object they last modified.
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Apart from the above attributes Tinzenite must also track versions of files to allow
detection of when objects have been updated. We will use a vector clock [Mat89] to
implement this, where entries represent peers and the associated number is the last
version where that peer actively contributed to the object’s history. The vector clock can
also be used to detect collisions. Note that the vector clock must only store the versions
for active, trusted peers as these are the only peers where versions can differ upon user
interaction. We avoid using a simple dirty flag for reasons of complexity: determining
which peer’s update to take in which order is not trivially doable with a simple boolean
flag. Utilizing vector clocks gives us greater flexibility, both for the implementation and for
any visualizations in the case of tracing changes. An example of the vector clock as we
will use it can be seen in listing 4.3.
It is important to note that the model will not be used to store peer reliant information.
This includes for example where the directory is placed on the peer’s file system, which
may differ between peers. Such information must be stored separately by the peer and
be applied when working with the data model, for example when determining what the
full path on the file system will be for a file that is to be written. Some properties are
also not suited to be transferred between peers. This includes file system or operating
system dependent properties such as usage rights, ownership, or flags. For Tinzenite we
will generally ignore these as the primary focus is just raw data synchronization without
semantic information.
4.2.1 Directory Model
0 {
1 "Directory":true,
2 "Identification":"db198086d1708794",
3 "Name":"test",
4 "Path":"test/test",
5 "Shadow":false,
6 "Version":{},
7 "Objects":[]
8 }
Listing 4.4: An example of a directory JSON object. Note that for brevity no files or sub di-
rectories are shown in the "objects" array. The version object is also left empty
here.
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Listing 4.4 shows an example of the proposed JSON structure for representing a directory.
A directory is somewhat special as it does not require the synchronization of an attached
binary file. This is the case for Tinzenite because directories are viewed independent
from their content.
The "identification" attribute is a random generated hash that uniquely identifies the
directory. The "path" attribute stores the concatenated relative full path from the peers
root directory to where the directory lies. The clear text "name" is also stored here as an
attribute. The "shadow" flag is used to signal whether the contents of the directory are
to be fetched or not. To differentiate between updates we require a "version" attribute
which represents a vector clock of peers and their last known version.
Finally an "objects" array is where the corresponding sub directories or files are recur-
sively placed. To model a directory as shown for example in figure 4.3 Tinzenite begins
the model with a directory model for the root directory. Within the objects array one can
the then find the two files and the two further directories. Each directory object in turn
also stores sub objects in its object array, thus recursively modeling an entire directory.
4.2.2 File Model
0 {
1 "Directory":false,
2 "Identification":"b83cf06d4e056e1a",
3 "Name":"else.txt",
4 "Path":"test/else.txt",
5 "Shadow":false,
6 "Version":
7 {
8 "927325d7a930dac9":1
9 },
10 "Content":"e4abda92f30700d751ac82f7454787d5"
11 }
Listing 4.5: An example of a file JSON object.
Listing 4.5 shows an example of the proposed JSON structure for representing a file
object. The "identification" attribute is a random generated hash that uniquely identifies
the file. The "path" attribute stores the concatenated relative full path from the peers
root directory. The clear text "name" is also stored here as an attribute. To differentiate
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between updates we require a "version" attribute which represents a vector clock of
peers and their last known version of this file. Important for detecting file changes is the
"content" attribute which stores a hash of the file’s binary blob. Finally the "shadow" flag
is used to notify a peer whether the file is locally accessible or must first be fetched from
other peers.
4.2.3 Object Operations
Based on the defined model we will now discuss which file or directory operations are
applied in what way to the model. Tinzenite relies only on the most basic file operations
for manipulating both the model and the actual file directory. Therefore we require only
the following four operations for the basic case to work:
Create Created files are detected by simply noticing files that do not exist in the
model yet and are not listed as removed. Files that have been created will be
added to the model at the correct location and their attributes calculated, if
not given. Tinzenite then checks whether it needs to fetch the file if it wasn’t
created in its own directory instance.
Modify Modification is either when the model does not match the file anymore, in
which case a new file must be fetched, or the content of the local file has
changed. This is detected via the content hash1. The model is updated to
match the file again.
Remove A removal is detected when a file does not exist anymore and was previously
tracked by the model. File removing is one of the most complex cases in
Tinzenite due to the insert delete ambiguity. We will solve this by storing
the models of deleted files until the delete update has been propagated
to all currently known peers. Only then the model is also discarded. For
this to work Tinzenite must always ensure that files that exist but are listed
as deleted are not added back to the model as a new file by continuously
checking the deletion list.
1Since hashing a file is an expensive operation we have also implemented that the hash is only checked if
the modtime of the file has changed since its last update. This greatly speeds up checking for modified
files.
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Figure 4.4: The life cycle of every object, file and directory, in Tinzenite with the allowed opera-
tions.
These three operations are not the only operations that a user can do on directories or
files. However they are all the operations that Tinzenite requires so that it can cover all
possible file state transitions. The choice of these three basic operations for Tinzenite
was heavily based on the paper discussed in section 2.2.2.
Therefore the life cycle of an object is very simple, as can be seen in figure 4.4. Objects
can only come into existence via the create operation. Objects can either be changed by
changing their content which is a modify operation, or by changing their location which is
a move operation. Finally objects can also be removed. If an object has been removed it
will stay removed unless the user creates a new clone of it.
In the following sub sections we show the actual definition of the specification and expand
on how Tinzenite peers react to them in more detail. This specification makes up the
core functionality of how the data synchronization happens within Tinzenite. Note that
these operations are only for trusted peers: since encrypted peers can not work on the
stored data they have no need for the file operations.
Create
The creation of an object can be trivially detected in Tinzenite. Basically there are two
cases where an object must be created: the first is local manual creation which implies
that the peer is the origin of the file; the second is creation via receiving a creation
message from another peer.
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In the first case, if the object does not have a representation within the model and is
not listed as removed, it triggers the creation case. Tinzenite creates the correct object
representation and inserts it into the correct place in the model. This includes creating
the unique identification hash and, if the object is a file, creating a hash of the file
contents. For a remote creation the peer will queue a fetch operation for the required file.
Only when the file has been received completely it is placed at the correct location and
the model will be updated.
Modify
The modification of an object is not as trivially detected as an object creation. Special
care must be taken in the case of conflicting changes which can obviously happen since
the directory is shared among multiple peers (see section 4.4). Here we will only consider
what happens once a modification has been detected. Again we have two possibilities
for triggering this case: a local file has been modified or the peer has received an update
message for a remote modification.
If the modification is detected locally we update the model to match the new directory
state for that object and then initiate an update message. If, on the other hand, we
receive a remote modification, we queue the fetching of the updated file. Upon receiving
the changes we apply them and finally propagate the update to the other connected
trusted peers.
Remove
Finally the deletion of an object is the hardest case within Tinzenite because of the
insert delete ambiguity as discussed in section 2.2.4. It is nontrivial to ensure that an
object deletion has been received by all required peers so that it truly and finally can
be removed from the complete Tinzenite network. A simple solution would be a list
of all deleted objects ever, but this list would promise to grow quickly on often used
synchronized directories. Therefore we require a sort of garbage collection so that we
can trim the list from deleted files that have been applied to all known peers.
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We will look at Tinzenite’s deletion of an object that has been removed locally first, then
discuss how the update propagates and what the other peers are required to do to
ensure a safe and complete deletion. Upon detection of a local deletion the trusted peer
creates a directory within the "removed" directory with the name of the removed object’s
identification hash. Within this directory the peer copies the list of currently known trusted
peers2 to the "check" sub directory. We utilize simple empty files named after the peer
identification hashes as entries since that is all the information we require for a deletion.
We will refer to these files as the peer entry files for the purpose of describing the rest
of the operation. To complete the removal operations required to initiate the removal
through the Tinzenite network, the peer writes another peer entry file to the "done" sub
directory. This sub directory contains a peer entry file for all the trusted peers that have
acknowledged receiving the deletion update. For an example of a removal directory for
a file, see figure 4.2.
Since the removal directory is also synchronized to all trusted peers they can continue
applying the removal. Each peer receives first the creation of the removal directory and
the deletion message for the object. Once the removal has been locally applied each
peer writes a peer entry file to the "done" directory – so long as it finds a corresponding
file in the "check" directory. If the peer knows of peers that do not have a peer entry
file in the "check" directory it must append them. This guarantees that all peers that
have known of the existence of an object will receive its removal. An example of where
this appending is vitally important is when a new peer has recently been added to the
Tinzenite network but its creation has not yet reached the deleting peer. In this case at
some point the removal and the creation of the new peer will collide and the peer where
the collision happens will append the newly created peer to the "check" directory. This
guarantees that even though the peer where the removal originated from did not know of
all peers, it will still wait for the new peer to also apply the removal. This is guaranteed to
happen as the new peer entry file for the appended peer will reach the peer where the
removal originated from before the removal is completed in any case.
2Note that encrypted peers must not be considered because they basically mirror only active peers,
meaning they are guaranteed to correctly apply deletions once the active peers have reconciled it.
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Once the last peer enters itself into the "done" directory it propagates the update one final
time and can then deletes the removal directory. It is important to note that this deletion
differs from other tracked removals: unlike when any other object is removed, deletions
within the "removed" directory must not trigger another round of tracked removals. This
would cause an endless removal of removals and basically bring the entire Tinzenite
network to a halt as each peer is swamped with keeping up. Instead the objects and
associated model entries are simply silently purged. Yet since it is very likely that not
all peers delete the removal directory at the same time we must guard it against being
unnecessarily reintroduced. Therefore each peer must locally remember each deletion
for a specified time span until it can be sure that all peers have applied the completed
deletion. During this time span each peer ignores the reintroduction of the deleted
objects3.
Now a final note on what happens should a peer receive a deletion update for an
object that it doesn’t know. In this case the message can not simply be discarded
silently as there is no other representation of the update in the object model. This
could lead to orphaned updates if the peer acts as a bridge between two peers that
were previously directly connected. Therefore unknown deletion updates should be
propagated if possible. However, since orphaned updates can only happen as long as
the peer list has not been fully updated between all peers, this is a sufficiently unlikely
case that we can live with. By adding a time stamp we can even detect orphaned deletion
updates and warn the user to help solve the issue. Alternatively we can also warn if we
have too many possibly orphaned updates, although this would signify a larger issue.
Since there is no way to reliably ensure that all peers are in the same state simply for the
reason that a peer may be offline at any point, there is little more we can do to ensure
clean removals. It is more important to work towards a common model state than to
ensure that previous states were legitimate for all peers.
3As an improvement to this behavior we also utilize notification messages to more rapidly terminate
removals. See section 4.3.5 for more details on this.
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4.3 Communication Specification
This section describes the specifications for the messages that will be used to syn-
chronize two models on separate peers. We start with defining how connections are
managed, then build on this to explain how new peers are added to an existing network.
Then we will specify the messages used for model synchronizations between trusted
and between trusted and encrypted peers. Finally we will briefly expand on the ordering
of messages and the expected emerging behavior.
Every peer views all connected peers as separate connections. A swarm behavior
only comes to pass because of the independent actions of every peer, not through a
combined communication between multiple peers. This primarily makes it relatively easy
to implement a Tinzenite peer, as the communication state is never between multiple
peers. Therefore a single peer has a base state of no other connected peers.
4.3.1 Connection Management
In this section we will discuss how Tinzenite connects to other peers. As we distinguish
between trusted and encrypted peers we must determine how the data we will send is to
be modified accordingly. Note that encrypted peers by default will not initiate connections,
only trusted peers will do that as they are the only peers capable of working on the user’s
data. Encrypted peers in general have a very passive role in the Tinzenite network.
Since each trusted peer has access to a list of all connected peers (see section 4.1.1)
this list is used for the initial presumption which connected peer is trusted and which is
encrypted. Therefore peers marked as encrypted are not even issued a challenge to
authenticate themselves. To vet trusted peers however the challenge must be issued and
met. Consequently the trusted peer queries each trusted connected peer in turn. Since
we should not trust a peer just because it has been marked as trusted, this query must be
cryptographically secure. An attacker that wants to connect to a trusted peer illegitimately
thus can not establish a clear connection without the required keys, which the attacker
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Figure 4.5: This diagram shows how peers handle the establishment of a connection to a known
peer.
should not be in possession of4. We define this as the authentication challenge. Only
if the challenge is successfully answered the other peer is considered trusted and the
following communication will not be encrypted. If the challenge is answered incorrectly
or not at all we can not be assured that the other peer is either trusted or encrypted.
Therefore we simply ignore it for all further operations5. This concludes opening a
communication channel with a connected peer.
Figure 4.5 shows an informal state diagram of how a peer reaches the idle state where
the connection is ready and set up, both for trusted and encrypted peers. The switch
from the disconnected state to the connected state is signaled by the underlying Tox
connection, meaning it happens when the other peer is online and visible via the Tox
channel. Once connected and if the peer itself is a trusted peer, a challenge is sent
4Tinzenite is designed to avoid revealing keys to outsiders. However attacks such as key loggers are
beyond its control.
5Ideally we would warn the user of this as it may result in peers being orphaned within the network.
Since this requires either the user having tried to connect to an insecure peer or a peer having become
compromised, the chance that this behavior is undesired is comparatively small.
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which contains an encrypted nonce. For a more comprehensive look at the challenge
response mechanism see section 5.4.3.
Note that a few points must be considered that can not be shown in the diagram. Since
Tinzenite is designed as a peer to peer network, no client-server structure exists. This
poses the challenge of who begins the construction of a connection, especially as we
can not distinguish between peers that have been online for a while already and peers
that just become activated when the base peer connects to the network. This is due to
peer to peer architecture of Tox: not all peers will respond to queries within the same
time frame. From a network perspective peers that are further away will seem to be
online slower than peers that are nearer. We solve this issue by having the peers use a
random back off time whenever a request expects an answer6.
Since we can not trust the other side of the Tox channel to be a Tinzenite peer, the peer
initiating a connection will not advance beyond the step where it expects an answer. This
means that for example an attacker would either receive only a challenge (to which he
can’t respond without knowing the keys) or the request for the meta information block to
which he’d have to answer correctly.
A short note on closing a connection: once established this happens when the underlying
Tox channel is terminated. Furthermore if something interrupts the establishment of a
connection, both peers will simply go back to the starting point. Establishing a connection
is done every time a peer reconnects.
4.3.2 New Connection Establishment
The previous section described how Tinzenite connects to known peers. This section
therefore discusses how Tinzenite connects to new peers, meaning peers that the user
adds to the network. Notably this is a manual process where the user is used as a
secondary channel to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks. Since a typical Tinzenite
network might have many peers, it is not desirable to have to authenticate a new peer
manually with every other peer. We therefore propose that the user only needs to
6For example the challenge message for establishing a trusted connection.
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Figure 4.6: This diagram shows the interaction required to connect a new peer to the existing
Tinzenite network.
authenticate the new peer with one existing trusted peer. From there the authentication
is synchronized to the other existing peers much like any other file or property update.
This bootstrapping process allows a user-friendly setup of peers.
Figure 4.6 shows how a user interacts with a Tinzenite peer and the Tinzenite network
(consisting of 1 to n other existing peers) to connect a new peer to the network for the
first time. As prose: the users simply start the new peer client for the first time, whether
encrypted or trusted. Then they can point it at the directory location, change settings,
and check whether a trusted peer is available. To establish an initial connection a Tox ID
of an available Tinzenite peer is required. The users can then command the new peer to
connect to this available peer by entering the Tox ID. To ensure that no man-in-the-middle
attack can happen the users will now have to confirm to the connection the available
peer. This means allowing the connection there and ideally ensuring that the seen Tox
ID is identical with the new peer’s Tox ID. Tinzenite then reports to the user whether the
newly connected peer requested can be registered as a trusted peer or not. Once the
connection has been confirmed for the given trust level on the other peer the channel is
opened and ready.
What happens next differs somewhat depending on whether the new peer is an encrypted
or a trusted peer. Since encrypted peers are passive peers the bootstrapping process
is finished once the peer has established a connection to a trusted peer. However the
encrypted peer at this state still lacks any encrypted files or more importantly the list
of other peers and the authentication file. It falls upon the connected trusted peer to
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initiate the first data upload, after which the new encrypted peer will have all the required
information.
If the new peer is a trusted peer it must autonomously complete the bootstrapping by
fetching all the files from the existing peer. This works even without an authentication
file because the existing peer has received user confirmation of the trust status of the
bootstrapping peer. This allows it to fetch all files unencrypted. Once all files have been
fetched the new trusted peer is ready to run. This includes immediately connecting to
other existing peers since the peer list is now also available to it.
Even if the new peer goes offline immediately after completing the bootstrap process, the
new peer information will be synchronized throughout the already connected peers once
they synchronize with the peer which accepted the new peer. This is possible because
the connection request by a new peer includes its own peer information, and when
the connection is accepted this peer information is immediately added to the "peers"
directory. Thus it will be synchronized to all other peers who will automatically accept
any connections of peers listed in the peer list.
Removing peers will work much in the same way from a system perspective. A user
can note a peer to be removed, resulting in it being removed immediately from the peer
where the action was initiated. The removal will then transit through online peers and
result in a complete removal once all peers have been online. An interesting aspect
to how to handle removal from the perspective of the removed peer is what to do with
the remaining data. For a trusted peer we might offer a choice whether to remove the
data or simply disconnect it from the Tinzenite network. On the other hand encrypted
peers can simply remove the data immediately as they can’t access it anyway. Notably
removing a peer requires no action on the removed peer’s side. This ensures that a peer
can be excluded even if direct access to the peer was lost.
4.3.3 Message Order
We must define which messages are required to be sent when to keep two models
between peers synchronized. Once the connection is established we must differentiate
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between trusted peers and encrypted peers. For trusted peers a connection is only
considered established after the Authentication Messages have been exchanged.
For trusted peers we propose the following message timing to enable rapid propagation
of updates throughout the network. Upon connection both peers will first exchange
models, providing essentially a snapshot of differences since the last synchronization.
This requires a message to request the model from the other peer. Since we will also
need to request files we use a generalized Request Message that can trigger a file
transfer. Upon reception of the model, both peers will merge the models and request
any changed files. At the end of a model request both peers should share a common
model state and associated directory state.
If local changes happen during or after the model has been exchanged the Update
Messages are used to notify the other model of the update without having to retransmit
the entire model again. However to ensure that all updates do propagate at some point,
ideally rather faster than longer, we propose that each peer resends the model every few
units. The exact spacing of when the complete model is resent is again up to the peer
itself and can be adjusted per instance. This allows mobile peers to work more energy
efficient by synchronizing less often in comparison to desktop peers where power and
bandwidth usage don’t play such prominent roles.
Since encrypted peers work passively it is again up to the trusted peers to ensure that
they are queried regularly. To avoid creating merge conflicts on encrypted peers which
these could not independently resolve since all data is encrypted, encrypted peers can
only be accessed by a single trusted peer at the same time. This will be negotiated via
Lock Messages. Once successfully locked request messages can be used to fetch data
from the encrypted peer. To place data on the encrypted peer we thus require a Push
Message.
4.3.4 Trusted Synchronization
Now that we have discussed how a peer is structured and how its connections are
handled, we can turn to how a trusted peer receives and sends messages via the Tox
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channel. Once the setup has been completed, as seen in section 4.3.1, the models must
be updated if they do not match. This happens normally when files and directories have
changed through user interaction.
Authentication Message
The authentication message is used to verify trusted peers against each other to ensure
that clear text data is only sent between themselves. The same method is used for both
challenge and response. For a more in depth look into how the mechanism works see
section 5.4.3.
0 {
1 "Type":"challenge",
2 "Encrypted":"5HFXCQBMwe6ohx9fKeLsNxaBsOK7+9pxWFiXX4aE4cRtdt8oUOHQBJ6XrowiwwgLunM="
3 }
Listing 4.6: An example of a valid authentication message containing a challenge.
Listing 4.6 shows an example of a challenging authentication message. The "Encrypted"
value contains the challenge value or the response value encrypted with the data
encryption keys.
Request Message
In general each peer does not rely on other peers to update. Therefore we propose the
creation of request operation which serves to request resources required for synchro-
nization with another peer. This request can be used both for the complete directory
model as for each specific file. It is important to note here that directories should never
be requested as they do not require attached binary data to be either created, modified,
or removed. Thus a request operation is only for operations that require data to be
transferred. Upon receiving the message the other peer starts a Tox file transfer which
the initiating peer knows to accept as it just requested it.
Listing 4.7 shows how a message to initiate a file transfer is structured. "ObjType" can
have the values object, peer, model, or auth. The peer and auth values are used by
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0 {
1 "Type":"request",
2 "ObjType":"object",
3 "Identification":"b83cf06d4e056e1a"
4 }
Listing 4.7: Example of a JSON request message.
the encrypted peer to differentiate these special meta data from normal encrypted files.
"Identification" is the unique hash that each object is referenced by.
By switching the "ObjType" attribute from object to model the other peer, whether
encrypted or trusted, can be commanded to send its current model. After comparing
the received model to its own model, the peer knows for which files it must request
data. Thus actively requesting a full model update periodically will still allow updates to
propagate independent of individual update messages at some point in time.
This message is also explicitly used to get an encrypted peer to initiate a file transfer
of the requested file or the encrypted model. The encrypted peer will respond with a
file transfer of the requested object if the trusted peer has successfully locked it. If not,
the trusted peer will receive lock denial messages until it has successfully locked the
connection.
Update Message
Continuously requesting and receiving the model is not ideal. For large directories just
the transfer of the model may require significant bandwidth. Therefore we have included
the option of sending current updates to all currently connected trusted peers so that
they can apply the update without first having to request the complete model.
Listing 4.8 is a message for broadcasting a model update to other connected trusted
peers. "Operation" can be any value of either create, remove, or modify. The key
"Object" contains the object representation for the updated object as seen in section 4.2.
The update message serves to keep both models in sync even after the initial synchro-
nization at connection establishment. Upon receiving an update message the peer
should immediately respond with a request message to retrieve the updated file. If a
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0 {
1 "Type":"update",
2 "Operation":"modify",
3 "Object":
4 {
5 "Directory":false,
6 "Identification":"b83cf06d4e056e1a",
7 "Name":"else.txt",
8 "Path":"else.txt",
9 "Shadow":false,
10 "Version":
11 {
12 "927325d7a930dac9":3
13 },
14 "Content":"cecef410a6ef0d3c3e101ab726af2776"
15 }
16 }
Listing 4.8: The message broadcast by a peer to connected peers to notify that an update has
happened.
peer receives a message for an operation that it has already applied, the message is
silently discarded. This does not disturb the propagation of updates since the peer will
have sent the update to the other connected peers if it already has the update. In this
way we ensure that every message propagates as far as possible without consuming
unnecessary bandwidth7. A positive side effect of the inclusion of the update message is
that updates propagate through active trusted peers within the Tinzenite network faster.
This in turn lowers the amount of time a user must wait for changes to arrive at another
peer.
4.3.5 Encrypted Synchronization
Communication with the encrypted peer is a special case as all operations on the
encrypted files must happen on the trusted peer. Since the encrypted peers can
not resolve conflicts we must ensure that no conflicts ever happen specifically on the
encrypted data. We do this by ensuring that only one trusted peer may synchronize with
an encrypted peer at once by utilizing a locking mechanism.
7Peers are of course free to implement message sending in any way since the update messages are not
critical for Tinzenite to work. Peers can simply only send update messages to a limited number of peers,
down to none if bandwidth is scarce for example in the case of a mobile device.
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Lock Message
0 {
1 "Type":"lock",
2 "Action":"request"
3 }
Listing 4.9: Message for negotiating a lock for a peer.
Listing 4.9 shows the format of the message used to negotiate a lock for an encrypted
peer. The key "Action" can have a value of request, release, or accept. The trusted peer
first sends such a request to which the encrypted peer can answer. If it answers with
release or fails to answer the trusted peer considers the encrypted peer already locked
and will retry at a later time. If however the encrypted peer responds with accept, the
lock is active.
Once locked we must ensure that the encrypted peer will not become stuck in a locked
state: we do this by having it implement a time out. This time out resets after every
received interaction from the trusted peer so that we do not accidentally time out on long
file transfers. If the trusted peer tries an operation while locked out, the encrypted peer
will respond with a denial message every time. Once the trusted peer is done with its
operations it should remove the lock by sending a release message.
Push Message
Since the encrypted peer is a passive peer, it requires a message to initiate a file transfer
when files need to be uploaded to it. We solve this by using a push message.
0 {
1 "Type":"push",
2 "Identification":"b83cf06d4e056e1a",
3 "ObjType":"object"
4 }
Listing 4.10: Message that is used to initiate a file upload to an encrypted peer.
Listing 4.10 shows the format of such a push message. Both "Identification" and
"ObjType" contain the same possible values as in similar messages.
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When an encrypted peer is locked to a trusted peer and receives a push message it will
respond with a corresponding request message. This request message will trigger the
trusted peer to encrypt the file and send it to the encrypted peer. The encrypted peer
will accept the file transfer because it now expects it.
For the peers and authentication file the different value of "ObjType" will allow the
encrypted peer to place these unencrypted files in a different location from the normal
data. This is required so that it can access them and work with the contained data
as required. Since trusted peers store the model internally and the model is privacy
sensitive as it contains clear text paths and names, the model is also stored as a special
file on the encrypted peer.
Notify Message
The notify message is used to notify special states to peers. For trusted peers it can be
used to signal that a removal has been fully applied to avoid reintroduction of removals.
Encrypted peers use it to signal trusted peers that a request can not be answered if a
file for a given unique hash identification can not be retrieved and transfered.
0 {
1 "Type":"notify",
2 "Notify":"missing",
3 "Identification":"b83cf06d4e056e1a"
4 }
Listing 4.11: Example notification message.
Listing 4.11 shows an example message for a missing object from an encrypted peer.
The value "Notify" can be either missing or removed. The "Identification" is the unique
hash for the object which the notification message references to.
4.4 Update Detection and Reconciliation
This section describes the theoretical side of the update detection: how we detect
updates on file systems in a way that does not consume too many resources from the
51
4 Architecture
hosting computer. Then we will discuss the interesting case of update reconciliation and
how Tinzenite reacts to conflicts.
4.4.1 Update Detection
When a Tinzenite directory is created the initial model of the directory is created and
stored as described in section 4.2. To detect changes within the directory Tinzenite
thus regularly compares the current state of all objects within the directory against the
previous model. If creations, modifications, or removals are detected they are applied to
the model and any further required operations will be completed.
Creations are simply detected when objects exist in the storage directory that are not
tracked in the model. The reverse is used to detect removals: tracked objects that do not
exist in storage. Modifications must be checked for every tracked existing object.
4.4.2 Update Reconciliation
The core algorithm for how update reconciliation is done is another important element
of Tinzenite. The following section introduces it and discusses the ramifications for the
system based on the initial model synchronization while leaving aside the object update
messages for now. These will be discussed once the basic mode is understood. Note
that only trusted peers actively resolve updates, although reconciliation can happen for
models received from both trusted and encrypted peers.
The reconciliation begins by receiving the model of the other peer. The model is
temporarily stored so that Tinzenite can work with it until the reconciliation is finished. To
guarantee that the directory remains consistent with the model right from the start we
propose a simple rule: the model of the local directory is updated atomically with the
successful reception of the binary object updates.
For each object in the received and temporarily stored model Tinzenite performs a series
of checks. For the sake of decreasing algorithm complexity we start with the easy case
of file creation.
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Object Creation
Object creations are trivial to detect initially. Any object that the remote model has
knowledge of that the local model has no equivalent entry for is considered as newly
created. The naive check is simply whether for a given remote object entry an entry
exists at the same path for the same identification. To avoid reintroducing objects that
have been locally removed but where the removal has not yet reached the remote peer,
we must also check this list of potentially created objects against all known local removals.
If the creation is for an object that has been locally removed we ignore it as the remote
peer is not up to date on this object. On the other hand if the creation is valid the local
peer can request the binary data if the creation is for a file. Finally when the file has
been received the creation is applied to the local model and the file written to storage at
the corresponding location.
Object Removal
A removal is detected much like a creation, although the roles of the local model and
the remote model are switched. Objects are considered candidates for being removed
if a remote entry does not exist for a local entry. However we again have to counter
the insert delete ambiguity. Thus removals are only considered valid if a corresponding
removal directory has been created for the removal as described in section 4.2.3. If such
an entry does not exist for a removal it is not a removal but a local creation that the other
peer has not yet applied. Thus if the removal is valid the removal can be applied and the
removal directory updated.
Object Modification
To detect object modifications we must check each entry that is neither created nor
removed. Since the local peer does not have access to the remote file to detect if the file
has been modified we must use some other mechanism to detect a modification. This
is where the vector clock as described in section 4.2 associated to each entry comes
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into play. For each candidate we compare the local vector clock state against the remote
vector clock state. Tinzenite checks for every entry in the remote vector clock whether
the local vector clock entry’s value is equal or lower. If the entry exists and the value is
equal or lower the local vector clock is current and the remote file has not been modified
since the last check. If an entry does not exist or a version is higher the remote entry has
been modified and we must fetch the file. What remains to be done then is to check for
a merge conflict. We do this by simply reversing the comparison: if the remote version
knows of all local version information it can be applied and the local file overwritten. If
the states diverge both objects have been modified. In this case we trigger a merge
conflict.
Local object not
modified
Local object modified
Remote object
not modified
Nothing Nothing (It is up to the remote peer to
actively fetch this update.)
Remote object
modified
Fetch remote object
and apply update
Resolve conflict
Table 4.1: This table shows the four possible cases that can result from comparing the versions
between two peers.
As stated Tinzenite uses only the model objects to detect changes, specifically only the
version attribute. As shown in listing 4.3 the version attribute contains a list of peers and
the last known version of the object they have. From this list we are only interested in
the versions of the remote peer and the local peer. By comparing these two attributes
between the versions that both peers have we can reliably detect how to proceed without
losing data. Table 4.1 shows the four possible cases. Since there is nothing to do
independent of our local state if the remote peer has no modifications8, Tinzenite will
check this first.
8This is the case because the other peer is responsible for requesting our local changes: the local peer
has no obligation to actively push changes.
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Conflict Reconciliation
As stated before Tinzenite considers files to be atomic entities and thus will not modify
them itself. Therefore no automatic conflict resolution will be implemented in the base
Tinzenite system. Thus Tinzenite must support the user in resolving conflicts. We do
this by clearly labeling conflicts by appending a special word to the object names of the
conflicting files. It is up to the user to actually resolve the conflict by editing, creating, or
removing objects. So now we must store both versions of the conflict in a way that it can
be easily resolved on any peer.
The solution we propose is in itself simple enough from a technical view. Basically, we
remove the old version of the object and replace it with the two conflicting versions.
As these are newly created files they can propagate through the network as any other
object would, allowing the conflict resolution to happen even on peers that did not see
the conflict initially. It is then up to the user to either keep both versions (likely renaming
them) or merge the changes into one object and remove the other. Both cases will be
propagated through the network as normal file operations.
4.5 Security Considerations
As stated in the motivation for this thesis in section 1.1 security and privacy are a
primary concern for this thesis. We believe it important to give a brief overview of
conceptual thoughts on the security of the proposed work. Please note that a full security
review is not the goal of this work nor within its scope. Nonetheless we hope that the
implementation will be secure enough for practical usage.
First we will concern ourselves with a network of only trusted peers. In this case
Tinzenite should be very secure as long as the user ensures that no man-in-the-middle
attack happens on setting up initial connections between new trusted peers. All further
communications are encrypted and authorized by Tox. This in turn means that Tinzenite
remains as secure as the software it is built on. As with any software all security is for
naught should the user make an error or allow the stored data to leak outside of Tinzenite.
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This is especially true as Tinzenite does not offer protection from other programs reading
out the stored data in a clear text directory as this would make intended changes very
difficult.
So what changes when encrypted peers are given access to the network? Not a lot
for the communication between peers itself: Tox still theoretically guarantees a fully
encrypted and authorized data channel. Since the data to be stored is encrypted on
trusted peers before being sent, direct access to the user’s data should also prove
difficult, pending that the encryption algorithm is secure enough.
Since encrypted peers receive the model and all associated files only fully encrypted,
this should not be a problem from a security standpoint. Trying to overwrite user data
by replacing the binary blobs with random blobs is detected by trusted peers when
comparing the unencrypted file with its hash from the unencrypted model: if they don’t
match the update can be marked as invalid and corresponding action taken. Detecting a
wrong model is trivially done by decrypting it and checking if it is valid syntax.
Some meta information is leaked however. Since we encrypt on a per file basis it is
theoretically possible to analyze file usage associated with size to identify pieces of the
user’s directory. This is only made easier by the fact that file sizes are roughly the same
whether encrypted or not, with an accuracy down to the block size of the encryption
scheme. For a future work proposal to solve this see section 6.2.2.
Possibly even more problematic is the clear text storage of the peer list even on encrypted
peers as it can be used to determine the size of the user’s Tinzenite network. To allow
encrypted peers to facilitate file transfer between two mutually exclusively online peers,
they must have access to this information. This problem is mitigated by the fact that
Tox identifications are hard to guess and not shared beyond the Tinzenite peer network.
Another possible risk is that Tox identifications can be used to monitor users’ devices
by querying the Tox network. Recovering a user’s IP addresses should not be possible
however as Tox employs onion routing to mitigate this risk [Toxc].
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Implementation
In this chapter we will expand on the process of implementing our proof of concept.
Before we can discuss the actual work of implementing the architecture we need to
define the developing environment. This will include an introduction of the software
libraries Tinzenite will base some of its functionality on.
5.1 Tools and Environment
In this section we will discuss the tools we used to build the software proof of concept.
This includes libraries we utilized and the software used to write the programs.
5.1.1 Golang
As previously stated the proof of concept implementation will be developed using the
programming language Golang. We will make full use of a range of features which we
will briefly highlight in the following.
A Golang program will compile into a single native executable file, with statically linked
dependencies. Cross compilation is available to all major operating systems and proces-
sor architectures. Unlike for example Java Golang does not depend on a virtual machine
to run resulting in performance that is near to natively compiled C code. Furthermore
Golang is not an object oriented language and based more on C than any other language.
Golang is statically typed and garbage collected. This gives us type safety and removes
the need to manage the memory ourselves. For a developer coming from Java a large
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standard library helps to ease the transition: Golang offers such a standard library. We
found writing Golang code to be less verbose than Java code for the same task while
not being any harder to comprehend.
Golang handles errors and exceptions differently in comparison to Java. While in Java
error handling is done explicitly via exceptions, Golang uses simple return values to
signal errors. This poses less of a problem than it may initially seem to as Golang
functions can return multiple values. Furthermore Golang exposes and allows working
with object pointers. Concurrency is also directly built into the language via so called "go
routines" and channels. Unlike Java which builds objects with class inheritance, Golang
uses composition and interfaces to build objects. Building on this Golang does not even
require the declaration of which interfaces an object implements – having the method of
an interface means that that object implements the interface.
Golang also lacks a few features, notably generics and function overloading. We found
these to be relatively easy to work around, although the lack of generics leads to an
increase in redundant boilerplate code in some instances. A possibly higher hurdle
is the lack of fine granular permissions: unlike Java Golang knows only private and
public variables and functions, indicated by their names beginning with a lowercase or
respectively uppercase letter.
As to the development environment surrounding Golang only a few specifics should be
noted. A very nice feature is that packaging is directly built on top of version control
systems. This means for example that "github.com/xamino/tox-dynboot" is both the
package path and the URL where the package can be retrieved from. Within the code
the package would be referenced by the name, commonly the last part of the package
path. Golang also requires all code to be formatted according to its specifications which
results in improved readability across different packages. A variety of tools are directly
built into the development suite, including a tool to fetch packages from their path and a
tool for vetting and formatting Golang code.
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5.1.2 JSON
0 type Message struct {
1 Address string
2 Subject string ‘json:"omitempty"‘
3 Content string ‘json:"Message"‘
4 read bool
5 }
0 {
1 "Address":"192.168.178.100",
2 "Message":"Log in successful!"
3 }
Listing 5.1: An example Golang struct with tags and its corresponding JSON representation.
Note that "Subject" is missing from the JSON due to the "omitempty" tag and "read"
due to it being private. Also note that "Content" has been renamed to "Message".
Since the underlying Tox channel is built for text based messaging we propose to
implement all peer to peer communication as a human readable messaging format.
We will therefore utilize Javascript object notation, short JSON, as a machine readable
message format while retaining easy readability for developers. As an added bonus
Golang has support for converting objects by default thanks to the standard libraries.
The generation of JSON can be fine tuned by utilizing in-language tagging. Listing 5.1
shows a very simple example.
5.1.3 Tox Binding
As stated in various instances before we will be building all peer to peer communication
on the Tox core library [Gitd]. Since the library is implemented with the C programming
language we require a Golang wrapper for it. Instead of implementing one ourselves
which would have cost us a large amount of development time we chose to use an
existing one. With some research we chose the wrapper written and provided by
codedust via Github [gota].
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At the start of the Tinzenite implementation this wrapper still lacked one significant feature
that Tinzenite required, namely the capability of sending and receiving files. However a
feature request [gotb] was submitted and promptly implemented by the maintainer. The
maintainer was also forthcoming in helping us solve bugs and problems with our usage
of the wrapper for which we are grateful.
5.1.4 Hadoop Client Binding
For the encrypted peer we required an implementation for a client for the Hadoop
distributed file system. We chose the implementation by the Github user colinmarc.
Notably we used the branch that adds write support [Gitb]. This library is not a wrapper
but an implementation of a HDFS client written in Golang.
5.1.5 Environment
Tinzenite was implemented on the Arch Linux distribution Antergos [Ant], specifically
the amd64 flavor. The Golang environment was set up using the corresponding Arch
package [Arc]. We used the Golang tools provided by the package to compile our work.
The code itself was written using the Atom text editor [Ato] with a variety of extensions,
most notably the support extensions for Golang. Git [Gita] was used for the version
control system, with a hosted repository on Github here [Gite].
5.2 Software Structure
Tinzenite was developed not as a single package but as a package collection where
each package covers some part of the complete scope. In this section we will discuss
the general layout of the packages and how they depend on one another. Figure 5.1
shows an informal diagram of the structure. All packages have their own repository on
Github [Gite].
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Figure 5.1: This diagram shows an informal representation of the package structure of our
implementation.
bootstrap Contains the library for bootstrapping both encrypted and trusted peers to
an existing Tinzenite network.
channel Building on the Tox wrapper implements an abstract object for all Tox
related communication code.
core Implements the functionality for a trusted peer.
encrypted Implements the functionality for an encrypted peer.
model Contains the directory tracking code which manages a Tinzenite directory.
server Built on the encrypted package implements an example server program
for an encrypted peer.
shared Contains various shared objects used by multiple packages.
tin Built on the core package implements an example user program for a
trusted peer.
We began the implementation with the model and the channel packages, then built
the core package on top of these. At one point we began writing shared code into
the shared package for reuse. The tin package was added early on for testing and
debugging purposes and grew alongside the trusted peer development. Once the basic
functions worked we implemented the bootstrap package. Then we built the encrypted
and server packages to implement the encrypted peer. Finally we adapted the bootstrap
package for both peer types.
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5.3 Highlights
The following section will serve to discuss highlights of the implementation. We will
also expand on some aspects of the implemented functionality where we believe an
expanded discussion is stimulating.
5.3.1 Model
The model package contains the model object used by the trusted peer to manage a
tracked directory. Instances of the model can be created either by loading it from a
JSON store or creating a new one. The model itself does not actively update itself if the
underlying directory changes: instead an update must be triggered by the utilizing code.
This allows the model to avoid having to employ file watchers. It thus falls to the utilizing
code to call the update method in regular intervals to ensure that the model remains up
to date.
The initial version of the model object only used file hashes to check for modifications,
according to the Tinzenite specifications. For large files or a large amount of files this
proved to be a very slow operation. Thus we also store the modification time as written
to the file system upon creation and modification of a file to the model. This attribute is
private to the model. As long as the modification time has not changed we do not need
to recalculate the hash as nothing has changed since the last check. Thus the model
is only required to recalculate the hash when the file actually has been modified. This
greatly speeds up the update detection phase.
Apart from reacting to direct directory changes the model object also allows remote
updates to be applied. Before a remote update can be applied a number of parameters
must be checked – therefore the model object offers a CheckMessage method that
returns whether the update must be truly applied. The update may be ignored for example
if it has already been applied, or when it concerns an already completed removal as
stated in section 4.2.3. Any call to ApplyUpdateMessage should be preceded by
applying this message check. Note that we have moved most of the removal logic code
to its own code file for easier comprehension.
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Any application of an update may trigger a merge conflict. This is signaled by the model
via an error. It is up to the caller to then handle the merge in a valid fashion, likely calling
the model to apply resulting updates to the directory. Tinzenite handles merge conflicts
as part of the core package.
Ignoring Objects
The model package also implements the matcher object. This object checks each
directory for a ".tinignore" file and if it exists applies it to any model work on the directory.
The file containing these rules can be synchronized just as any other file at any level
within a directory. Any new objects detected by Tinzenite that are listed in this file will not
be created within the model, effectively keeping it out of the Tinzenite network. Since
it may well happen that a ".tinignore" is created at a later point and thus introduces an
uncertainty in handling the files to be ignored we propose a simple solution: the file is
only ever applied for object creations. Once a file has been created within the model it
will be modified and deleted as any other file within the system, independent of whether
it was or is to be ignored.
0 # DO NOT MODIFY!
1 /local
2 /temp
3 /receiving
4 /sending
Listing 5.2: The ".tinignore" file contents for the ".tinzenite" directory. Note that it allows com-
ments. In this example only directories are excluded. Files can be excluded too:
lines starting with the slash are considered file ignore rules.
The ".tinignore" file is used in the ".tinzenite" directory to control which parts are syn-
chronized and which not, as mentioned in section 4.1. Listing 5.2 shows the contents of
this ".tinignore" file. Note that ignoring objects is supported within the complete Tinzenite
directory: users that are so inclined can add such files themselves to control what
objects Tinzenite synchronizes. We added support for comments to improve readability
for users. The current implementation does not offer support for regular expressions or
more advanced matching grammars, although these features should be comparatively
simple to add.
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5.3.2 Channel
The channel package wraps the Tox wrapper into the channel object via which all
communication is sent. The channel object makes use of callbacks to allow callers to
react to incoming messages, file transfers, and other events.
Since the underlying Tox instance must be called in regular intervals, the channel object
implements a background go routine that keeps Tox ticking. To avoid locking up the Tox
instance on callbacks, each callback is called asynchronously. If a callback can result in
a direct response that must be passed to the Tox instance, another method is available.
Tox requires bootstrapping to known nodes to connect to the Tox network. This boot-
strapping is different from the bootstrapping of peers we will discuss later. The channel
object makes sure that the Tox instance is bootstrapped to the Tox network if it is not
connected as long as the channel is kept running. We dynamically retrieve a list of
available Tox nodes using a specially written package [Dyn]. This list is used to try to
connect a given channel to the Tox network.
Unlike both the Tox instance and the Golang wrapper for it, the channel object wraps the
file transmission nicely. If a file transfer request is received it asks the utilizing code via a
callback whether to accept the transfer or not. If accepted it will again notify when the
file has been successfully received or the transfer failed. Tox itself handles file transfers
in data blocks. For our purposes the abstraction of this process greatly simplifies quite a
lot of code that builds on file transfers.
The channel object furthermore offers a wide range of helpful methods that are not di-
rectly available from a Tox instance. This includes handling all addresses as hexadecimal
encoded strings versus byte arrays and a number of status functions.
5.3.3 Tin Program
The tin package is an example implementation of a trusted peer built on the core package.
While a true client built on a stable Tinzenite version should interface with the user via a
64
5.3 Highlights
graphical user interface, we forewent this because of the increased development time.
Thus the Tin program is a simple command line interface based program.
It offers a range of flags to make a Tinzenite directory easier to manage. Each instance
of Tin should run for a single trusted Tinzenite peer. Additionally the program can also
be used to create new peers and bootstrap them to the Tinzenite network. In the case
of bootstrapping an encrypted peer the program will exit on successful completion. For
trusted peers the program will immediately continue by running the directory. If a trusted
peer receives a bootstrapping request it asks the user to validate the given peer address
and requested trust level.
The program also automatically updates the local directory, requests remote updates,
and synchronizes with available encrypted peers at certain intervals. This serves to
prove that Tinzenite can run completely without user input. In fact apart from setting up
a peer the synchronization runs fully without user input, even if merge conflicts arise.
Care was taken to ensure that the entire program could run using as little resources as
possible. Currently the program runs with negligible CPU and RAM usage even though
synchronizing regularly. The only truly expensive operation where the program requires
more performance is for hash generation and encryption when handling files. On an Intel
Core i5-4440 with 4 physical cores at 3.1 GHz, each instance of Tin remains under 1%
CPU and around 9 MB of RAM usage over a prolonged period of time when no update
operations beyond model synchronization are executed.
The core package itself wraps the complete trusted peer code. Basically it uses the
model object and the channel object to offer all trusted peer functionality. Notably it also
implements how Tinzenite handles merge conflicts. For software written against it the
core package exposes a Tinzenite object with which the trusted peer can be controlled.
5.3.4 Bootstrap
Initially we planned to include the bootstrapping code directly within the tin and core
packages. However the differences in how a peer must react to incoming messages and
transfers would have greatly increased the already substantial code complexity of these
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packages. Therefore we moved all bootstrapping related code into its own package.
This has the large advantage that programs can easily implement just bootstrapping if
required to without needing any further package imports.
The basic function of bootstrapping is relatively simple. It requires the address of the
trusted peer to connect to and sends a Tox friend request to it to initiate the connection.
Once the friend request has been accepted and the trusted peer has been connected
the actual bootstrapping takes place. For a new trusted peer that includes fetching the
complete current state of the directory. Once the transfers are complete the bootstrapping
code finishes and the directory can now be started as a normal trusted peer.
The bootstrap package was mainly implemented in one sitting and serves as a proof
of concept that the previously implemented code for the trusted peer program could be
reused easily. Apart from bug fixes we only had to update it once we implemented the
encrypted peer functionality.
5.3.5 Server Program
Much like the Tin software the server package provides an implementation for the
encrypted package. It offers a command line interface program for creating and running
an encrypted peer.
0 package encrypted
1
2 type Storage interface {
3 Store(key string, data []byte) error
4 Retrieve(key string) ([]byte, error)
5 Remove(key string) error
6 }
Listing 5.3: The storage interface that the encrypted peer must implement to use the encrypted
package. Comments have been removed.
Adding encrypted peers to Tinzenite required two tasks to be successful: the imple-
mentation of the encrypted peer and the extension of the trusted peer to be capable of
utilizing it. The first task of implementing the encrypted peer proved to be comparatively
simple. Basically all it has to do is offer a lock to any single trusted peer and the, when
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locked, allow the fetching and retrieval of files. Most files the encrypted peer handles are
user data files. One of the goals for this thesis was to support writing these files to the
Hadoop distributed file system. Therefore we implemented the encrypted peer so that
all user files are written with a specified storage interface as seen in listing 5.3. However
this storage interface is not used for all files. The authentication file and the peer files are
required to exist unencrypted and are required for the encrypted peer to run correctly.
Therefore these files are written to disk within the "org" directory1.
The storage interface allows encrypted clients, such as the server package provides an
example of, to interface with any storage interface a developer requires it to. For this
thesis we implemented two versions of the interface for the server program. First for
debugging and personal use we implemented a version of the interface that simply writes
all data to disk, named as the key of the data. Retrieval looks up the file by checking for
the existence of a file named as the given key and returns the associated data. Then
we implemented the actual Hadoop capable version of the interface. Our version of the
interface creates a connection to a Hadoop distributed file system when initiating. All
further file accesses will then be handled as operations on the Hadoop cluster.
Once the encrypted peer was implemented we turned to the more complex task of
integrating encrypted peers into the capabilities of the trusted peer. This meant modifying
the core package so that trusted peers could differentiate between trusted and encrypted
peers and communicate with each accordingly. Upon receiving a message the trusted
peer always first checks whether the message came from an encrypted peer or a trusted
peer on a case by case basis. We do this by checking the address of the sender against
the known peer list and ensuring that trusted peers have been authenticated. The
message is then passed on to the specific logic for the type of peer.
The logic for handling an encrypted peer comes down to a relatively simple process.
Upon successful locking an encrypted peer to itself, the trusted peer requests the
encrypted model. If the encrypted peer responds with a notification that the file doesn’t
1The encrypted peer does not share the directory structure of a trusted peer. The reason for this is that an
encrypted peer lacks many of the features that went into the design of the ".tinzenite" directory. Thus a
simpler, flatter structure was chosen.
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exist the encrypted peer is considered empty and the logic skips to uploading the current
state of the trusted peer.
If a model is received the trusted peer must first compare the remote model against its
own model to check for changes. Unknown updates of the encrypted peer are applied to
the trusted peer by fetching the necessary files. Once this is complete the next step is to
update the encrypted peer to the state of the trusted peer. Updates that the trusted peer
has but the encrypted peer lacks are uploaded and finally the current model is encrypted
and also uploaded. Then the encrypted peer is unlocked so that other trusted peers can
access it too.
5.3.6 Golang Issues
We encountered a small amount of gotchas due to our unfamiliarity with the Golang
language. In the interest of full disclosure we will use this section to briefly touch on
these matters.
Tinzenite builds heavily on the standard libraries included with the language. Since
Golang is still a relatively new language we expected to encounter bugs and issues as
we implemented Tinzenite. However we only encountered a single bug. It effected the
generation of a random integer for issuing a challenge. After creating a valid random
int64 value for the challenge we required a byte slice representation of the variable
to encrypt it. We had to determine the size of the byte slice so that the variable could
be stored in it. Research lead us to believe that utilizing the byte.Size method would
allow us to make the byte slice just large enough to contain the random number. But the
method always returned incorrect values. Our workaround is to simply create the slice
large enough for all possible values at a small memory cost.
The good performance of Tinzenite was initially not the case. First versions of the trusted
peer had a slow memory and processing leak resulting in steadily rising CPU and RAM
usage until the host computer killed the process after a few minutes. We tracked this
down to our usage of an endlessly running go routine utilizing time.Tick to run in
intervals. As stated in the method documentation the underlying Ticker can not be
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closed, thus resulting in a leak [Tic]. We worked around this issue by simply reusing the
timing objects instead of recreating new ones within every interval.
Another problem was that we had no way to determine the type of struct we required
to parse incoming JSON messages. Thus we implemented a "Type" attribute for all
messages which we use to determine the correct type of the message. Golang’s
composition was not a viable way of solving this to our satisfaction since all message
objects did not have any differing methods. The correct way to do this is to parse the
incoming messages to an empty interface which is valid for all types. The type can then
be checked and the message can then be casted.
0 type MsgType int
1
2 const (
3 MsgNone MsgType = iota
4 MsgUpdate
5 MsgRequest
6 MsgNotify
7 MsgLock
8 MsgPush
9 MsgChallenge
10 )
Listing 5.4: One of the enumerations we defined for Tinzenite. Note that for brevity we removed
the comments.
For the defined messages that Tinzenite uses we heavily relied on enumerations for
setting values. Coming from Java we expected to find similar enum functionality in
Golang. This did not prove to be the case. Golang lacks a specific implementation of
enumerations but does allow for something similar using the const and iota keywords
for specified variable types. An example can be seen in listing 5.4. Our largest issue
with this was that when converting these enumeration similes to JSON instead of the
name of the enumeration the number value was output due to Golang seeing them as
number value variables. Thus instead of having JSON where each enumeration was
easily interpretable we had values such as "MsgType":1 where what we wanted was
"MsgType":"update". The solution to this requires a lot of boilerplate code since
Golang does not support generics at this point in time. For each defined enumeration
type we had to write custom MarshalJSON and UnmarshalJSON methods, which we
did where applicable.
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5.4 Security
This section will discuss the scheme used to encrypt and decrypt files within Tinzenite
and how the keys are stored and shared. Generally speaking Tinzenite uses two
encryption layers to ensure file security. We will also briefly discuss the exact method
we utilize for the challenge response algorithm.
The encryption scheme we used in Tinzenite is the NaCl library [BLS12] through its
interoperable Golang package [Gold].From this package we utilize just three methods:
GenerateKey, Open, and Seal. They are used to generate encryption keys, decrypt
data, and encrypt data.
5.4.1 File Encryption
Every Tinzenite network generates a single permanent key pair which is used to encrypt
and decrypt data. Each peer upon creation generates these keys but will overwrite
them with the network’s keys if connected to an existing network during bootstrapping to
ensure that each Tinzenite peer uses the same keys. Otherwise peers could not share
encrypted peers between themselves as each would use a different set of encryption
keys. The keys themselves are generated using the cryptographically secure random
number generation provided by the host operating system to ensure that they are truly
random.
File data is encrypted before sending it and decrypted after receiving it when exchanging
data with encrypted peers. To encrypt and decrypt data via NaCl we require an associ-
ated nonce which must be atomic but unique to every encryption decryption cycle. We
require a way to store and retrieve the nonce for each encrypted data blob. Instead of
writing the nonce somewhere else we opted to prepend the nonce to the encrypted data.
Thus the first 24 bytes of every encrypted file contain the nonce required to decrypt it
again. Figure 5.2 shows an example of how this works.
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Figure 5.2: This diagram shows an example of how the nonce is integrated into the data for an
encrypted message.
When decrypting data we must thus remove the nonce from the data before decrypting
it. Since the decryption requires the nonce we can simply use it directly. The nonce is
then discarded and the decrypted data is ready to use.
5.4.2 Key Encryption
Now that all data can be encrypted and decrypted correctly the question turns to how
to store the corresponding keys safely. At first glance a simple solution would be to
synchronize the keys only between trusted peers. However this would not allow an
implementation for a web peer as described in section 3.4.4. A temporary peer could not
request the keys because it could not authenticate itself. Thus the keys must be stored
alongside the encrypted data.
It is immediately obvious that simply storing the keys in plain text next to the encrypted
data offers no security. So the keys must be encrypted too but with another set of keys.
The question then is where to store these keys for encrypting the encryption keys. Since
Tinzenite should be user friendly and secure we opted for an interesting algorithm for
generating the keys that unlock the actual encryption keys. To differentiate the two
different sets of keys we will reference the encryption keys which are used to encrypt
and decrypt the other keys as the box keys.
On creating a Tinzenite network the user is asked for a password or better yet a
passphrase [Mun11]. We then use this passphrase to generate the box keys used to
encrypt the encryption keys. Now the encryption keys can be encrypted with the box
keys and safely transmitted to both trusted and encrypted peers. The question now
arises how other trusted peers can retrieve the box keys.
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The answer lies in the user given passphrase and the way the box keys are generated.
Every trusted peer must be unlocked by the user with the passphrase2 to decrypt the
encrypted peers. This passphrase is not stored somewhere in the Tinzenite network for
a directory, meaning an attacker has to guess it.
0 func (a *Authentication) convertPassword(password string) (public *[32]byte, private
*[32]byte, err error) {
1 hasher := fnv.New64a()
2 hasher.Write([]byte(password))
3 seed := int64(hasher.Sum64())
4 seededRandom := unsecure.New(unsecure.NewSource(seed))
5 wrapper := staticRandom{random: seededRandom}
6 public, private, err = box.GenerateKey(wrapper)
7 if err != nil {
8 return nil, nil, err
9 }
10 return public, private, nil
11 }
Listing 5.5: The method for generating the box keys from a given passphrase. The
staticRandom object is a wrapper for the random source so that it can be passed
to the box.GenerateKey as the correct type. It is defined elsewhere.
The box keys are then generated from the passphrase. First we hash the passphrase to
a number hash value. This number hash is then used to seed a pseudo random number
generator. We then utilize this deterministic random number generator to create the box
encryption keys. Listing 5.5 shows the entire code required to generate the box keys
from a given passphrase.
This method of storing the encryption keys has a few advantages over other approaches.
An important advantage of decoupling the passphrase from the encryption keys via the
box keys is that this allows the user to change his passphrase if desired. Tinzenite must
then only decrypt the encryption keys with the old passphrase and encrypt them with the
new one. The update will then propagate through the network3. Encrypted peers do not
need to be encrypted anew since the actual encryption keys remain the same. Another
advantage is that the entire encryption process is tied to a passphrase that is simple to
2Note that the trusted peer should store the passphrase once the user has entered it to avoid needless
repetition and to increase the ease of use for future accesses.
3Note that we make no provisions for invalidating old passphrases since this would require substantially
more encryption work and would most likely not be enforceable.
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remember and the user can freely assign and modify. Apart from said passphrase the
user must do nothing to ensure full encryption security for the Tinzenite network.
5.4.3 Challenge Response
The challenge response we use in Tinzenite is built on a very simple challenge. For
each challenge we generate a random number and locally store it, then encrypt it with
the data encryption keys and send it to the other peer. This responding peer decrypts
the message and retrieves the number. It then increments it by one, encrypts its answer,
and sends it back4. If the received number is one value higher than the stored number,
the challenge response is valid.
The challenging peer can thus be satisfied that the other peer is valid because it proved
that it could validly decrypt and encrypt the correct values. The responding peer knows
the challenging peer is authenticated because it could issue a valid challenge for the
network data encryption keys. In all the challenge response mechanism for Tinzenite
requires only two messages and a single random number to validate both sides of the
exchange.
4What we actually do with the number is irrelevant as long as both sides of the challenge response
algorithm use the same operation. The only property the operation must have is that it is sufficient to
prove that both sides could read the unencrypted number and work on it.
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Results and Recapitulation
This chapter will discuss the proof of concept implementation and recapitulate on how
the architecture was implemented. Specifically we will elaborate on the state of our
implementation in relation to existing services. We will then discuss future work. Our
future work can be divided into two broad categories: improvements on the existing
solution and expansion on top of it.
6.1 Comparison
In this section we will briefly and informally compare Tinzenite with existing solutions.
Note that an actual study comparing our solution with other storage providers was not
the intended goal of this thesis. All information used to compare the different solutions is
to be taken with a grain of salt.
6.1.1 Network Performance
Tinzenite shares a large advantage with the other related peer to peer solutions that
have been discussed. Because the peers communicate directly with each other the
synchronization speed for peers within the same local area network is substantially
higher than the server-client solutions that must first upload data to a remote server. In
the local area network where Tinzenite was mainly developed the only speed limit was
that of the wireless internet for data transfers.
When transferring data between two peers over the internet at large Tinzenite is restricted
by the broadband upload speed of the user’s internet connection. While generally
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speaking the upload speed is only a fraction of the download speed for most consumer
connections, Tinzenite does not suffer under this. This due to that when comparing
transferring a file via Tinzenite and any server hosted service, both require an initial
upload of the file. Tinzenite actually wins in terms of speed because by the time the
upload has been completed, the other Tinzenite peer already has the complete file
downloaded. Server-client alternatives must still download the file to the other client
additionally.
6.1.2 Usability
Here Tinzenite in its current state definitely loses out to existing solutions. While running
the software requires little to no user interaction, the setup and management of peers is
currently only available via command line interface programs. Nothing speaks against
implementing a graphical user interface in principle. This was not an essential part of
our work however so no such client was implemented due to time constraints. And
while Tinzenite theoretically supports web access to encrypted peers (see section 6.2.2
below), this capability was also not tested or implemented. We believe that web access
would improve usability by a large margin and allow Tinzenite to close the feature gap.
Tinzenite’s features are complete in that it can and does synchronize directories correctly.
However further work should be done for edge cases where the usability could be
improved, such as for merge conflicts. By notifying and offering support in resolving
merge conflicts Tinzenite could provide a more active support for its usability. Such
features could easily be integrated into a client program without requiring modifications
to the underlying Tinzenite code.
A feature important for the security of a Tinzenite network is support of clients for strong
passphrases. Users should be guided to create long and secure passphrases because
then they become increasingly harder to guess.
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6.1.3 Security
Tinzenite’s security is built on one of the most scrutinized encryption libraries currently
in existence, the NaCl library [Ber09]. Therefore the encrypted data that untrusted,
encrypted peers receive should be more than sufficiently secure to deny unauthorized
third party access even if the server peer is accessible. Should services running
encrypted peers be requested to hand over user data by hostile governments, said
data would be inaccessible without guessing the passphrase1. Thus the security of
the user data primarily depends on the user’s willingness to use a sufficiently complex
passphrase. Note that Tinzenite does not provide data deniability: if the user is forced to
give up the passphrase [Mun09], no further mechanisms prevent full data access.
Theoretically the capability of working with encrypted peers is Tinzenite’s distinguishing
point between all existing implementation mentioned in section 2.1. Like other peer
to peer solutions Tinzenite works directly between peers with most of the associated
advantages. Additionally Tinzenite allows for off site backup of the users’ data. Unlike the
server-client solutions Tinzenite does not require an account or trust in a third party. We
believe that Tinzenite therefore combines the best of both worlds in regards to security
while retaining readily available access to user stored data for authorized entities.
None the less, Tinzenite should not be trusted with secure data at this point in devel-
opment. Since encryption is hard to implement correctly we are not confident enough
of our implementation of the various aspects of the encryption scheme. Furthermore
Tinzenite should only be trusted after a security audit has been performed on the core
logic. Tinzenite’s open source nature however allows any interested party to audit the
code at their own leisure. Tinzenite does leak some information: namely the peer list
is available unencrypted along with the authentication file. While a small risk as no
personal user information is stored in those files it is still a possible attack vector for a
malicious peer.
1Without knowing the passphrase the box keys can not easily be determined. Therefore the actual
file encryption keys which are encrypted with the box keys are stored securely enough to ensure
confidentiality.
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6.2 Future Work
Tinzenite offers a lot of room for future work, both concerning the current implementation
and expanding on the provided work. This section will serve to discuss many of the points
we believe could greatly benefit any further work on Tinzenite. Thus we will begin this
section by discussing changes to the current Tinzenite architecture and implementation.
We will conclude this section by offering an outlook of further work that could be based
on the existing implementation.
6.2.1 Improvements to Existing Work
Since our implementation of the architecture was built from the ground up without
previous knowledge of many of the aspects touched on by this work, we encountered a
number of things that should and could be improved.
Data Transfer
We believe our implementation not to be fully optimized for the best possible data
transfer characteristics between a peer network. Thus improvements to how Tinzenite
fetches and sends data could be implemented to improve robustness and speed of data
transfers.
In our implementation when a trusted peer receives an update, the associated file is
fetched from the peer where the update originated from. If the update is received from
multiple peers only the first peer is used to fetch the data. Building on the same ideas that
led to the development of the BitTorrent protocol, we could implement swarm fetching
capabilities. This would allow the unchoking of saturated peers where upload speeds
are slow and allow the file request to complete even if one peer out of many goes offline
or encounters issues.
Issues may arise for implementing this for two reasons. If delta fetching is implemented
as described below, care has to be taken to keep the swarm behavior compatible even
if multiple peers have varying states of the original file. Another source of possible
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issues is how to combine it with the existing encrypted peer behavior. Since encrypted
peers are currently locked to a single trusted peer for a synchronization this precludes
having them partake in a swarm apart from the issue that the encrypted peer will transfer
encrypted data while trusted peers will transfer unencrypted data.
Peer Behavior
Trusted peers of the current Tinzenite implementation synchronize with timing based
intervals. While this works sufficiently for the proof of concept, ideally it would not be
the case. Instead peers should dynamically adjust the timing and order of operations for
when to synchronize based on the network environment and current status of the own
directory.
An example for this includes pausing the remote synchronization interval if outside
changes are still being fetched to avoid unnecessary double fetch requests and associ-
ated work. Another example would be extending the Tinzenite core package to allow for
finer control over which peers will synchronize and then implementing the client program
so that peer synchronizations happen in a smarter fashion. To reduce the work load for
programs building on Tinzenite this could even be implemented within Tinzenite itself.
This could include synchronizing only once when initially connected and then simply
updating locally, avoiding unnecessary complete model comparisons. Synchronization
with encrypted peers could also be improved to avoid locking multiple encrypted peers
at once and ensure that they are kept up to date at a reasonable rate.
Delta Updates
Fetching a file in Tinzenite currently always transfers the complete binary data, even if
only a small part of the file was changed between two versions. Thus an improvement
would be to implement that Tinzenite only sends the differences between two versions of
a file between peers. We propose to use rsync algorithm for this [TM+96], specifically
the librsync implementation [Lib]. The required information for the library to work can
be integrated into the existing request messages. Delta updates could only be used
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between trusted peers since the encrypted data is completely different for every change.
Only needing to send the changed part of a file should increase the speed of Tinzenite
transfers immensely, expecially for large files.
Server Peer
The current implementation for the encrypted peer was implemented for a single Tin-
zenite network instance. It could be extended to provide service for multiple Tinzenite
networks and multiple users. User accounts can be differentiated by reading parts of the
authentication file: the user name can be checked with the bcrypt hash. Care should
be taken to ensure that the user does not provide the same access password like the
passphrase used to access the Tinzenite encryption, although this won’t be enforceable
by Tinzenite.
Another feature that the server client should be capable of is enforcing potential size
restrictions. This feature may also be used for a future mobile client as described in
section 6.2.2. What this means is that Tinzenite should support clients refusing to fetch
additional files to enforce a specified size of a directory. It could be implemented by
building on the shadow files capability which we will expand on in the next section.
The interesting case is of course what happens to files that are above the limit after a
modification: we propose either making the file a shadow file as soon as it crosses the
limit or allowing modifications to push the size above the limit temporarily. For encrypted
peers the enforcement of size restrictions must be handled by the trusted peers. This in
turn means that encrypted peers must be capable of denying additional updates since
trusted peers can not be trusted to correctly enforce a size limitation.
Shadow Objects
Depending on the location of a client a user may wish to only access specific files without
having to get an entire set or updates. This is a nice feature to have in the case of space
and bandwidth restricted devices such as mobile devices or for the web interface. This
feature could also be used to prioritize which objects Tinzenite will fetch first.
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Functionality for the shadow file feature is available via the currently unused "shadow"
attribute. It affects only files directly as the creation of directories is not significant from a
size point of view. The attribute only serves as a shortcut to set all files of a directory
implicitly to being shadowed. If files are marked as shadow files they are not updated
on the disk, only their model. By setting the shadow flag to true the client will then
immediately try to fetch the binary file from connected and available peers.
Shadow files pose a few additional difficulties that would have to be solved. First and
most trivial: what happens to an already synchronized file when the shadow attribute is
set? We propose that the file is immediately removed although this could be expensive
in terms of bandwidth if the users quickly change their mind again because the file must
then be fetched again all anew. A more sophisticated approach would integrate the size
restriction capability of the client as proposed previously. By setting the space limit to
a number below the full size of the directory, files will only be immediately removed if
near the space limit. If the users change their mind the file may thus still be immediately
available.
So what do peers do if they receive a model update where the shadow flag is set?
It is important to note here that the shadow flag is considered to be transient when
synchronizing models, meaning its value is considered to be local only. However it is
still sent because it is used to determine whether the receiving peer can fetch an update
from the other peer if applicable. Again it is up to the peer what happens upon receiving
a shadow file update: normally a peer that has a non shadow copy of the file will ignore
shadow updates as it can not fetch the binary file update successfully from it. It will then
have to wait for another peer to offer the update where the attribute is not set.
The final edge case is a challenging one: what Tinzenite does not provide is a way to
ensure that one full copy of the shadowed file is always kept somewhere. If the user
marks a file as shadowed on all peers it may well happen that Tinzenite loses the file. For
now we propose to avoid this by explicitly warning the user of this possibility. One way to
mitigate this risk is by allowing user defined shadowed files only for specific clients: we
can probably assume that any full desktop peer should always retain a full copy of the
directory anyway.
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Implementation Improvements
Our current implementation, while working, is surely not the best way to implement it.
Not all possible error cases are handled in the most optimal way possible. Furthermore
the implementation of Tinzenite could use extensive testing and debugging.
6.2.2 Expanding Work
Tinzenite offers a lot of room to build on. In this section we will discuss some proposals
for building on our work instead of modifying it. Note that some expanded features
require features from the previous section.
Encrypted Peer Synchronization
Each encrypted peer is a single point of back up in the current state of our work. This
requires each trusted peer to check up on each encrypted peer in turn and ensure that all
of them are kept at the same synchronization state. This could be improved by allowing
encrypted peers to update each other. Care has to be taken that encrypted peers will not
cause merge conflicts that they can not resolve, since both the model and its objects are
fully encrypted. We thus propose to extend the Tinzenite architecture for all encrypted
peers to work as a single meta peer, where in truth multiple instances are kept in the
same, most up to date state possible.
This would require some further logic in how to detect and merge different encrypted
peer states. Generally it could be done if the directory model had an unencrypted version
state attached to it. As long as no model conflicts arise, all encrypted peers can keep
updating themselves to the most current version. If however two encrypted peers receive
conflicting update states, the entire swarm of encrypted peers would need to wait for
a trusted peer to resolve the issue. This would require some large extensions to the
current protocol, but in theory should be doable.
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Data Obfuscation
In the case of encrypted peers simply encrypting a file may not be sufficient to prevent
meta information collection on the directory contents. Thus we propose that future work
could include modifying the encrypted peer implementation and the transfer protocol so
that trusted peers send not only encrypted but also obfuscated data to encrypted peers,
effectively implementing an oblivious storage system [GO96]. This especially makes
sense if combined with the swarm behavior mentioned previously and the encrypted peer
synchronization. The entire group of encrypted peers could then be used to obfuscate
and store data redundantly. This would increase the third party security and further
reduce the trust of said party required. Obfuscation would be sufficient to hide most
meta data that may be deduced from encrypted synchronization.
Update Feedback
While our implementation allows for a basic feedback of large file transfers in the form
of basic progress meters, a lot more detailed and better specified feedback could be
offered to peers. This would allow them to signal to the user of outstanding updates
– such as updates that it has received but not yet applied because the transfer is
pending. Generally such features would also tie in with the better control of peer
behavior previously mentioned. If the user can quickly see at a glance the general state
of the local trusted peer or even other connected peers, usability of the entire Tinzenite
network increases. It would also increase the user’s trust that the synchronization is
working as intended.
Additional Peer Versions
Our current implementation of Tinzenite offers two peers: a standard trusted peer for a
personal computer and a peer for encrypted storage. As discussed in section 3.4 we
have already considered adding a mobile client for smartphones and a web interface
client for temporary access to an encrypted peer, plus a passive peer for secure cold
storage.
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A mobile peer would be a trusted active peer of the Tinzenite network. As previously
discussed however the mobile peer would most likely not retain a full copy of the Tinzenite
directory due to size and bandwidth limitations. Thus both shadow objects and size
restrictions are likely prerequisites for a mobile client. On the positive side little else
would need to be changed in our provided work as Golang can be executed on both of
the most popular mobile operating systems currently in use, Android and iOS. Indeed
the entire application could be written in Golang, building on our already completed work,
by utilizing the mobile package [Golb].
The web interface peer would be an interesting challenge. It would allow the users to
log in to a web server and enter their passphrase. The web peer would then be capable
of fetching and decrypting the model file and allow the user to upload and download
encrypted data directly from an encrypted peer. This could happen entirely without
requiring the underlying Tox communication architecture. All data to and from the web
server would be fully encrypted since decrypted data would only be kept on the web
interface peer. The moment a user closes the web page all temporary data would be
discarded. This would enable users to access their data stored in the Tinzenite network
anywhere where they have internet access, as long as they have encrypted peers that
enable this feature.
Finally a cold storage peer could be offered. Technically it would not be a true peer
of the Tinzenite network, but for the sake of this text we will reference it as a passive
peer. A user could command a trusted Tinzenite peer to utilize a storage location as
a passive peer. Tinzenite would then encrypt all local files and its current state and
write the data to the specified location. This location could be anything from a USB stick
to more permanent storage device. If the users wish to update the passive peer they
would not even have to do it at the same peer: any other trusted peer could be used
too. This other trusted peer would, similar to how the encrypted peer works, read and
synchronize the passive peer against itself. This would allow passive peers to be used
both as safeguards against data loss and even as secure transport containers. Two
trusted peers not connected via the internet could be kept synchronized manually by
regularly moving a passive peer between them.
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File Versioning
Another advanced feature that would be very nice to have and close the gap of feature
parity between Tinzenite and other existing services would be the capability to offer file
versions built directly into the Tinzenite architecture. Indeed the core protocol would not
even have to be changed to support this: all that is required is the capability to keep old
files for a specific time somewhere where the peer can reinstate them if the user wishes
to.
We propose to implement this as follows. First, for every created object that Tinzenite
detects, it copies the initial version into a hidden directory for future reference. Then,
whenever a change within the file is detected, the delta update functionality can be used
to store the difference between the old version and the new version of the file. A file
removal could be marked specifically. A setting could be introduced to allow the user to
control how far back different versions of an object are kept to keep storage requirements
at a reasonable level. Thus it should be comparatively easy to only retain the last three
versions of an object. Trusted peers could then offer assistance in actually managing the
versions if the user wants to reinstate one over the current object.
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7
Conclusion
This chapter serves as the conclusion of our work, both the theoretical part and the
practical proof of implementation. We will terminate this thesis with a closing statement.
7.1 Theoretical Work
We have developed and discussed the design decisions for a peer to peer encrypted file
synchronization software. Before defining our concept we looked at existing work and
academic papers to help us define the features we would like to cover in chapter 2. In
chapter 3 we discussed the general scope of the undertaking and defined the concept
of this work. We combined most features users have come to expect from any other
available data storage service with features required to retain the security of the users’
data into an encompassing concept. Chapter 4 thus served to define the actual archi-
tecture we would implement as a proof of the concept of the basic functionality. We
discussed how we proposed to define the storage space to work for all required use
cases and how the peers would communicate between themselves. We then discussed
our implementation of the proof of concept work in chapter 5. We went into detail in how
our implementation is structured and how we implemented core aspects of the proposed
architecture. Finally we wrote about the finished implementation in chapter 6. We
explained the current feature state of the implementation in comparison to existing work.
Furthermore an outlook on the multiple possible future improvements and expansions
was given.
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7.2 Implementation Work
A large part of our work was the implementation of a proof of concept for the proposed
Tinzenite software suite. This includes example user programs for both the trusted peer
and the encrypted peer. All of our code can be found in the Github organization for
Tinzenite [Gite].
Beyond providing a proof of concept implementation which covers the essential scope,
we also used tools, a programming language, and libraries new to us for our work on
Tinzenite. Thus we expanded on their implications in section 5.1. Our implementation
language of choice was Golang. We built the communication of Tinzenite on the Tox
communication protocol, thus allowing Tinzenite to build on an existing end to end
encrypted communication standard. For the encrypted peer we implemented a storage
interface that allows server clients to store the user data in any available storage system.
We included two example implementations for this interface: a simple one that writes
the data to disk and another one that allows the server client to write user data to the
Hadoop distributed file system.
7.3 Closing Statement
We have shown our results of developing and implementing a data synchronization
library for secure peer to peer data storage. This includes preparatory work not only by
comparing existing services and academic papers but also developing a new protocol
for data exchange. This library, named Tinzenite, was subsequently implemented as a
proof of concept and two example client implementations were also developed, a trusted
and an encrypted peer. While various aspects could still be improved and expanded on,
the basic scope of the thesis has been completed.
Retrospectively we are satisfied with the promise of Tinzenite. We consider our work
to be usable for academic, exploratory, and developing purposes but would refrain
from utilizing it in a real world scenario due to outstanding security and improvement
considerations.
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Encrypted Connection
An encrypted connection is utilized between encrypted peers and between an
encrypted peer and a trusted peer. Messages are partially modified (encrypted and
/ or anonymized) to preserve the data privacy.
Encrypted Peer
An encrypted peer contains an encrypted copy of the directory. The keys for
encryption are not shared with it. All messages it receives contain anonymized or
encrypted information (for example file names) wherever necessary.
Fourth Party
We define fourth parties for the purpose of this work as follows: for a first party
communicating with a second party using a service provided by a third party, fourth
parties are those that partake in this communication without the first or second party
knowing of it. Specifically this includes governmental agencies such as the National
Security Association or hostile entities such as industrial espionage.
Nonce
A nonce is an arbitrary number that should be used only once. Nonces play
important roles in cryptographic practices. In Tinzenite nonces mostly serve to
avoid replay attacks by making each encryption unique even if the same content is
reencrypted.
Third Party
A third party is defined as a party that offers a service for the first party and second
party to communicate. This can range from a messaging service such as Skype to
a service provider such as Dropbox.
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Tinzenite
The name of the core software library of this thesis.
Trusted Connection
A trusted connection is only between two trusted peers. All information that flows
over it is complete and in clear text.
Trusted Peer
A trusted peer has access to the encryption keys and contains an unencrypted copy
of the directory.
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